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CHAPTER I
THE PHENOMENON OF INTEREST
Introduction

The practice of restraining patients has had a long history in the behavior
management of aggressive individuals with mental illnesses.
~

If a madman suddenly experiences an unexpected attack and 3.rms himself... the
director speaks in a thunderous voice .... At the same time, the servants
converge on him at a given signal... each seizing one of the madman's
limbs .... Thus they carry him to his cell while thwarting his efforts and chain
him if he is very dangerous ... (Pinel, 1794/1992, p.731)

Current Illinois statute dictates that "restraint may be used only as a therapeutic
measure to prevent a [patient] from causing harm to himself or physical abuse to
others" (Illinois Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, 1994,
p.13). Although the concept therapeutic is vague and ill-defined, the practice of
res~g

patients is traditionally considered to be therapeutic if physical restraining

devices are used with the intent to prevent a patient from causing harm to self or
others (American Psychiatric Association, 1984; Bursten, 1975; Moss & LaPuma,
1991). In that sense, physical restraining devices, according to Fisher (1994) "work."
This conclusion, however, is derived from the observation that the patient's behavior
is interrupted and controlled by the use of these devices and from research that has
focused almost entirely on identifying behavioral precipitants to the restraining of
patients (Bornstein, 1985; DiFabio, 1981; Guirguis & Durost, 1978; Phillips & Nasr,
1983; Roper, Coutts, Sather & Taylor, 1985; Sheridan, Henrion, Robinson & Baxter,
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1990; Soloff, 1979; Telintelo, Kuhlman & Wing, 1983; Way, 1986). There is no
evidence that patients learn more adaptive behavior (Walsh & Randell, 1995).
The problem with the majority of the research about restraining patients,
however, is how this practice has been conceptuali:red. And it is this
conceptuafu.ation that then drives the methods used to investigate this phenomenon.
In most of the studies, the use of physical restraining devices has been viewed as an

event that is without context. The researchers rarely acknowledge that the practice of
restraining patients occurs to a person, by other pecmle in a particular setting, under
particular circumstances, for particular reasons. They do not acknowledge that this
practice is part of a whole and that this practice not only comes out of a tradition of
managing psychiatric patients, but involves individuals who bring their own history to
the experience.
The majority of researchers who have investigated the phenomenon of
restraining patients search for generalizations regarding (1) who is likely to be
physically restrained, (2) the frequency of the use of physical restraining devices and
(3) the behavior that precipitates the application of these devices. However, this
research results in generalizations that are either inconclusive or obvious. Therefore,
these conclusions do not provide any meaningful understanding of this practice. For
example, one may conclude from the psychiatric research that violence or aggression
usually precedes restraining a patient. This conclusion seems obvious and is not
extremely helpful because it is difficult to predict who will become aggressive (Cahill,
Stuart, Laraia, & Arana, 1991; Roper & Anderson, 1991).
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There continue, then, to be unchallenged assumptions regarding the practice of
restraining patients on psychiatric units. These are:
1. Restraining patients is necessary for the protection of the individual, other
patients and staff.
2. Patients on psychiatric units lack internal self-control and therefore need to
be controlled or violence will prevail.
3. Restraining patients is a therapeutic practice. Because psychiatric patients
lack internal control, they are relieved or comforted by these external limits or
controls.
4. Restraining patients is not a harmful practice.
Those who restrain patients continue to assume that without devices to physically
restrain patients, they would be unable to control the aggressive patient and
consequently, be unable to provide a safe environment. There is, however, no
empiric evidence for this conclusion and in fact, there is some evidence that the
practice of physically restraining patients may actually increase violence on the
inpatient psychiatric unit (Morrison, 1990b; Roper & Anderson, 1991).
Traditionally, justification for the practice of restraining patients has focused
on the safety needs of the patient and others and the underlying belief that patients
who are out of control feel a sense of safety and comfort in being restrained. There
is also the belief that other patients feel anxious and threatened when there is the
threat of aggression or violence on a unit. While these beliefs may be supported by
clinical experience, there has been no research to support these beliefs. To date,
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there has been only one study (Sheridan, et al., 1990) that has asked psychiatric
patients how they felt about the restraining experience. In this study, 41 % said that
being physically restrained calmed them or prevented them from hurting someone, yet

51 % expressed negative reactions to being physically restrained. There have been no
studies that have asked patients how they felt about seeing other patients who were
aggressive and/or restrained.
A Tradition of Restraining
In psychiatry, devices have long been used to restrain the psychiatric patient.

Their use is usually justified as protecting the patient and others from harm. But
historically these devices have often been used as methods to coerce the patient into
behaving "appropriately." If one looks at the use of restraining devices throughout
history, the treatment of the mentally ill person was more harsh in Colonial America
than it had been in previous centuries. Some authors have attributed this change in
treatment to the influence of Puritanism and to the common belief that mental illness
was caused by demonic possession.
Puritanism, with its stem repression of healthy human instincts, its abnormal
orientation around religion and its exaggerated expressions of alternate
suspicion and credulity, offered a fertile soil for the development of this mania
[witch hunts] (Deutsch, 1949, p. 32).
As a result of these beliefs, the sufferings of the afflicted members of the community
were looked upon as the natural consequences of a stem, unyielding God, who passed
judgement on the "wicked" and "innately inferior." Those whom the community
perceived to be destitute and dependent were therefore treated with contempt.
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At that time and until the Nineteenth Century, patients in mental institutions
were chained to their beds or to rings attached to the floor (Hunter & Macalpine,
1963; Kraepelin, 1962). During this period, insanity was treated primarily by
confinement in institutions. These institutions were less medical establishments than
systems of order, more closely resembling judicial systems (Foucault, 1965). These
methods of confinement arose from fears that the mentally ill person possessed
unusual strength and from the underlying belief that insanity uncovered the person's
underlying animality (Foucault, 1965; Zwelling, 1985). Thus, the patient was viewed
as foolish, stubborn, insolent, wicked, malicious or insubordinate. Since patients
were seen as comparable to stubborn, ill-mannered children, they were thought to
require the same stem treatment (Kraepelin, 1962). Therefore, the primary purpose
of restraining a patient was behavioral coercion. The primary goal was to suppress
the patient's behavior and, consequently the symptoms of insanity (Zwelling, 1985).
This period of repressive confinement continued through much of the
Eighteenth Century and according to Deutsch (1949), was the worst in the history of
the treatment of the mentally ill. The principles underlying this treatment were
custody, repression and behavioral control through coercion. Control was maintained
because discipline was rigidly enforced. Those patients who broke the rules were
severely punished. Various methods were used to accomplish these outcomes:
She was lifted up by force, plac' d in and fixt ~ to the chair in the bathing
tub .... I kept her under the fall thirty minutes, stopping the pipe now and
then .... A week later I gave her another tryal l1i£] by adding a smaller pipe so
that when the one let the water fall on top of her head, the other squirted it in
her face ... till her spirits being almost dissipated, she promised to love· him as
before. (Blair, 1725/1963, p.328)
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It was formerly supposed that lunatics could only be worked upon by terror,
shackles and whips .... In the furious state, the arms and sometimes the legs
must be confined .... When the patient is mischievous and unruly, I ship him up
in his cell, order the window to be darkened, and allow him no food but
water-gruel and dry bread till he shews [Si&] tokens of repentance ... (Ferriar,
1795/1963, p. 545)
In the most violent state of the disease, the patient should be kept alone in a
dark and quiet room .... The hands should be properly secured, and the patient
should be confined by one leg; this will prevent him from committing any
violence... (Haslam, 1809/1963, p. 635)

Other methods of coercion included the coercion chair, the tranquilizing chair, the
rotary chair, baths, such as the bain du suprise, whereby the patient was suddenly
dropped into a bath of cold water, the strait waistcoat (strait jacket) and the douche,
which consisted of spraying a strong stream of cold water on the patient's head.
Beginning in the Eighteenth Century and culminating in the mid-Nineteenth
Century, there was primarily in England and Europe, a movement toward "moral
treatment" of the mentally ill. This movement included an attempt to eliminate the
practice of restraining patients. Conolly was most well-known for advocating the
elimination of this practice in England (Kraepelin, 1962). The aim to eliminate the
use of restraints, however, was but one aspect of a method of treatment that
advocated improved accommodations, adequate food, sympathetic care of the patients
and activities to occupy the patients (Conolly, 1856/1973). In other words, moral
treatment meant that the staff should approach the patient with compassion and
understanding, thereby creating an environment where spontaneous recovery could
take place. The patients were treated with respect and dignity and were dealt with as
if they possessed all of their faculties. The psychiatric staff, at this point in history,
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felt a sense of hope and optimism that their patient's illness could be cured. Patients
were treated as respectfully as possible and were allowed as much freedom from
personal restraint as feasible, hoping that this treatment would effect a cure. And yet
the safety of the patient and others remained central. Therefore, while staff treated
the mentally ill person with kindness, they also maintained the expectation that the
patient would modify unacceptable behavior.
Moral treatment might be defined as organiz.ed group living in which the
integration and continuity of work, play and social activities produce a
meaningful total life experience in which the growth of individual capacity to
enjoy life has maximum opportunity. (Bockoven, 1963, p. 76)
Thus, one objective of moral treatment, as it was practiced by the Quakers,
was to develop in the patients internal means of self-restraint and self-control.
Whereas physical measures were previously used to achieve these goals, the Quakers,
as major advocates of moral treatment in England and the United States, were
convinced that their religious values were conducive to social harmony and stability
(Grob, 1973). They believed that self-restraint was fostered by the powerful influence
of the Quaker religion.
Because of this strong religious influence, Foucault (1965) did not think that
the release of the mentally ill from their chains was the celebrated act of liberation
that others have declared it to be. Foucault argued that the strong principles of the
Quaker religion served to create a milieu that coerced the patient into constraint.
Religion was simply another method that those in authority used to exert control over
the mentally ill person. Since those in authority believed that the influence of religion
was strong enough to exert its restraining power over the insane, the atmosphere
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became one of threat and fear. This created an institution where "the free terror of
madness [was substituted by] the stifling anguish of responsibility" (Foucault, 1965,
p. 247). This moral milieu, imposed from those who ran the institutions, controlled
the person's madness but did not cure it. Consequently, the milieu became one of
anxiety, with the insane person being threatened with physical controls should the
rules of the institution not be obeyed. In other words, the suppression of the practice
of physically restraining patients was really only a substitution of the pressure to
restrain oneself.
Moral treatment and the move to eliminate the practice of restraining patients,
were met with antagonism in the United States (Bockoven, 1963; Deutsch, 1949) and
ultimately failed. There are several theories that attempt to explain this failure.
According to Bockoven (1963), those in the United States who advocated the
elimination of this practice did not understand that moral treatment was a complex
and all-encompassing method of treatment and not simply the elimination of physical
restraining devices. Deutsch (1949) stated that those who supported the continued
practice of restraining patients believed that restraining patients actually improved the
patient's self-esteem. They also believed that the use of restraints was necessary in
order to prevent violence. Proponents of restraining patients believed that physical
restraining devices were peculiarly necessary in America because of the nature of its
people and the influence of its climate. These individuals felt that the climate of
England bred mild and complacent people, while the climate in America bred more
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violent people. As Deutsch (1949) quotes one psychiatrist who was against the
abolition of restraints:
The patients in European institutions, accustomed as they were to unquestioned
acceptance of authority, might willingly submit to "moral" restraint, but not
your liberty-loving American who, sane or insane, would never agree placidly
to the imposition of authority by an individual, and hence could be restrained
only by mechanical means. (p.216)
If the practice of restraining patients was abolished, these psychiatrists believed that

other practices to coerce the patient would inevitably emerge (Deutsch, 1949). The
insinuation was that Americans, by nature, and especially those who were mentally
ill, were more aggressive and in need of external control. Therefore, they would not
comply with verbally imposed controls nor be influenced by the environmental
changes that were promoted by moral treatment.
The failure of moral treatment has also been attributed to the death of its
major supporters, who left no one to carry the legacy. Of the thirteen original
founders of American psychiatry who had been proponents of moral treatment, only
two were still practicing in the 1870's (Freedman, Kaplan & Sadock, 1975). After
their death, the passing of this tradition was further complicated by the reality that
moral treatment as a philosophy was difficult to articulate since it reflected social and
intellectual trends, rather than medical theory. Moral treatment consisted of treating
the insane person in a particular way. Moral treatment meant treating the patient in a
kind and humane manner.
Another reason given for the failure of moral treatment was the overcrowding
of state hospitals with paupers, criminals, alcoholics and vagrants. There was also, in
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addition to the overcrowding of the state hospitals, a shortage of well-trained staff. In
New York, for instance, state mental hospitals were staffed with inmates from the
penitentiary (Grob, 1973). At this time in history there existed neither the numbers
of staff nor the caliber of staff to practice moral treatment. Consequently, the
treatment became more and more custodial in nature (Grob, 1973; Zwelling, 1985).
Finally, in these state hospitals, the numbers of chronically, mentally ill
patients greatly increased. This increase contributed to a growing sense of pessimism
regarding the patients' curability (Grob, 1973; Zwelling, 1985). A shift in emphasis
regarding the cause of mental illness from environmental factors to heredity also
contributed to this pessimism (Bockoven, 1963; Freedman, et al., 1975). Therefore,
intolerance toward victims of misfortune resurfaced under the guise of science and
along with it, a belief that the social order was fixed by laws of nature analogous to
those of physical order (Bockoven, 1963).
To have been successful, Grob asserts, moral treatment would have required
small, personalized institutions. As the institutions expanded and the patient
population became more heterogeneous, and without adequate staffing, the issue of
maintaining control became dominant. Of central concern to the staff was how to
manage the behavior of the patients who were disruptive and threatened the safety of
others. In these situations, the superintendents of these institutions could not trust that
their staff could manage these patients' behavior without the staff, themselves, becoming aggressive. This resulted in the staff's increased practice of relying on physical
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restraining devices and the belief that this reliance on physically restraining patients
was preferable to other means of physical control (Grob, 1973).
While these reasons for the failure of moral treatment in America give one a
sense of what was occurring historically, they do not address underlying reasons why
these events might have occurred. Why, for example, were the state hospitals
permitted to become so large? Why were untrained staff hired to attend to the
mentally ill patients? Why were there not adequate numbers of staff hired to
successfully implement moral treatment? It might be, as Bockoven states, "that the
way a society treats its mentally ill is but a manifestation or particular instance of the
way the members of that society treat each other" (Bockoven, 1963, p.89).
An answer may be found first by exploring the prevailing view of the nature

of the person in America, who at that time was seen as violent, unruly and aggressive
and therefore more apt to need to be restrained by another individual. And it may,
secondly, be found by exploring how this view of the person has contributed to
attitudes toward individuals whose behavior places them on the fringes of what is
generally considered acceptable. There are two tenets of Calvinism as practiced by
the Puritans that are particularly relevant to this discussion. These are the depravity
of human nature and the immutability of the person. These tenets have helped shape
America's cultural view of the nature of the person and may therefore assist us in
understanding why moral treatment and the move to abolish the practice of physically
restraining patients failed in the United States.
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As a result of the Fall of Adam, Calvinists believed that all people were born
depraved, corrupt and with a propensity to sin (Anderson & Fisch, 1939; Brand,
1991; Edwards, 1970).
Man was happy enough at first and might have continued so to all eternity .. .if
he had not willfully and sinfully rebelled against God ... By our fall, we are cast
down so low into sin and misery, so deeply plunged into a most miserable and
sinful condition ... (Edwards, 1992; p.392-393)
Evidence of this depravity of human nature was grounded in the observation that
individuals not only have a tendency toward sin, but that this tendency to sin is
greater than one's tendency to perform virtuous acts (Edwards, 1970).
The state which has been proved mankind are in, is a corrupt state in a moral
sense, [and] is inconsistent with the fulfillment of the law of God .... This
depravity is both odious, and also pernicious, fatal and destructive ... [and]
shews (jj&], that man, as he is by nature, is in a deplorable and undone state,
in the highest sense. (Edwards, 1970, p. 129)
I presume that ... a tendency to guilt and ill-desert [is] in ... vast overbalance to
virtue and merit; or a propensity to that sin, the evil and demerit of which is
so great, that the value and merit that is in him ... are as nothing to it; then
truly the nature of man may be said to be corrupt and evil. (Edwards, 1970, p.
130)
Therefore, one only had to observe the behavior of individuals over time to conclude
that efforts to restrain them from sin have been unsuccessful, thus confirming the
belief that the disposition of the heart was naturally corrupt and evil. Edwards
concluded that this propensity for evil could be inferred from the observation of "a
tendency to continual sin; a tendency to [a] much greater degree of sin than
righteousness, and from the general extreme stupidity of mankind" (Edwards, 1970,

p. 158).
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Therefore, Calvinists believed that without the influence of God (grace), the
depraved nature of human beings was determinate and unchan&in&.
The general continued wickedness of mankind ... proves each of these things,
viz, that the cause is fixed and that fixed cause is internal, in man's nature and
also very powerful. (Edwards, 1970, p. 193)
We are weak and unable to save ourselves. We cannot do without God's
help ... We are like persons that are falling from a precipice into some dreadful
pit and cannot possibly stop ourselves from falling still further. We must look
and pray to God for help, or else we are inevitably lost. (Edwards, 1992, p.
332)
Since Calvinists believed that it was God who determined which individuals were
saved, one's behavior would eventually reflect this status. Therefore, social behavior
was considered to be an indication of this election. In other words, good social
conduct was considered to be the

~

of salvation, rather than the cause of it

(Morgan, 1966; Vaughan, 1972).
One's character, then, was thought to be fixed. Therefore, there was little one
could do to change one's behavior. Those whose behavior fell outside of what was
considered acceptable were thought to be, and were treated as if they were locked into
particular social roles (Erikson, 1966). Calvinists believed that those elected to be
saved eventually moved into positions of leadership, whereas those not elected to be
saved eventually sank to the lower levels of society.
Productive work was thought to be further indication

tha~

one was elected to

be saved. Persons would illustrate their chosenness by acquiring a vocation (Carroll,
1977; Vaughan, 1972). Puritan society demanded and valued personal initiative,
therefore, individual members of society were expected to contribute diligently to the
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good of the whole. Each person was expected to responsibly and successfully conduct
one's life business (Myers, 1970).
Despite this inclination to sin and despite the inability to influence one's final
outcome, individuals were held responsible for their own behavior (Carroll, 1977;
Vaughan, 1972). Societies were also held responsible for the behavior of individual
members (Vaughan, 1972). Therefore, it was the duty of societies to exercise strict
control and discipline, as well as surveillance of its members. Otherwise, God would
punish the community for not maintaining its part of the bargain. Societies,
therefore, not only had the right, but they had the obligation to expel members of that
society who disobeyed the laws of God. These members were seen as wicked thereby
deserving to be rejected and abhorred (Edwards, 1970; Vaughan, 1972).
Justice then, was rendered with certainty and with little effort to understand
the purpose behind the behavior (Erikson, 1966). It did not matter how severely the
person was treated because this punishment was thought to be only a preview of what
was to come. The substance of Puritan philosophy, then, was to control the person in
every phase of one's social life, through discipline (Anderson & Fisch, 1972). Since
one's behavior indicated one's status in the eyes of God, this status would then be
reflected to the outside world. Therefore, disorder was seen as

the~

of sin.

Erikson (1966) has argued that these Puritan values continue to influence the
way America as a nation feels about and responds to individuals whose behavior has
drifted outside the boundaries of what is considered acceptable. According to
Erikson, every society has different practices for designating people to "deviant"
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status and for regulating the movement of these individuals into and out of these
roles. In Puritan New England, deviance was seen as a static position whereby individuals would be more or less confined to particular roles in society. Characterizing
an individual as deviant was said to describe that person's state of grace and spiritual
condition.
[This] reflected a theory of human nature which was largely unique to
America.... Although Puritanism started as an international movement and left
its imprint on many corners of the world, the peculiar ethos it generated took
root mainly in the United States, and this heritage is still evident in methods
we use to handle deviant conduct. (Erikson, 1966, p. 204)
Si&nificance to Nursin&
Historically, the practice of restraining psychiatric patient has been
underpinned by the need to control the person in order to provide safety on the unit.
Yet this rationale is rarely overtly acknowledged. When it is alluded to, it is in the
context that the behavior needs to be controlled (Grigson, 1984), not the person. The
person, however, cannot be disconnected from this event, for it is the person who is
being restrained. In the psychiatric research, this person has been hidden behind the
behavior that precedes and is said to justify this intervention (American Psychiatric
Association, 1984; Grigson, 1984; Hay & Cromwell, 1980; Lion, Levenberg &
Strange, 1972). This focus on behavior objectifies the person as inappropriate
behaviors and a diagnosis.
There is a notable absence of discussion in the current psychiatric literature
relative to whether we ought to be restraining patients. Of further note is the absence
of an attempt by researchers to understand the experience of being restrained and the
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impact of being restrained on the restrained person. This neglect of interest in and
investigation of the person's experience of being restrained may be accounted for by
two phenomena. The first is a philosophy of science that describes the aims of
science as explanation, understanding, prediction and control. The goal of this view
of science is to identify general laws regarding behavior so that the scientist will be
able to explain and predict events (Kerlinger, 1986). In this case, it is the prediction
of who is likely to be restrained. Science in this view is objective, systematic and
controlled.
The second phenomena is related to current notions of the psychiatric patient
as a person. Despite laws that have been developed to protect the rights of the
psychiatric patient, there continues to be a stigma attached to being mentally ill. This
attitude can be traced historically to values, present at the founding of this country
that persist despite their current lack of relevance. Consequently, because the voice
of the mentally ill person has not been regarded as important, it has remained
unheard.
This neglect of interest in and knowledge about the experience of being
restrained becomes important, however, as one questions whether psychiatric nurses
QYght to restrain patients. This question has been lost in a tradition in psychiatric

nursing that has come to value controlling the patient and justifies restraining patients
as a means to provide safety on the unit.
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Pur,pose of the Study
While safety on the unit is important, concern for the person and the needs of
the person should be primary. Because of the paucity of knowledge available
regarding the use of restraints, this practice of restraining may violate the moral
imperative of nursing, which is to promote the well-being of the patient through
excellent practice (Bishop & Scudder, 1990). Since excellent practice requires an
understanding of the meaning that our practices have for the patient, it is essential that
we understand what being restrained means to the people we restrain. The purpose of
this study, therefore, is to understand the meaning of the experience of being
restrained to those who have been restrained on a psychiatric unit.

CHAPTER II
THE MEANING OF RFSTRAINT
Introcluction
In order to articulate the meaning of being restrained we must first be clear
about what meaning is and where it originates. Thus we need a theory of meaning.
Traditionally, there have been two schools of thought regarding the origin of
meaning. The first school of thought places meaning within an entity and thus
assumes that the properties of that entity (what constitutes that entity) are contained
within it. If one wishes to articulate the meaning of that entity, one needs to elucidate
the essence of that entity. The second major school of thought places meaning within
the perceiving subject and assumes that meaning is then projected upon the entity
from the subject. If one wishes to articulate the meaning of an entity, one needs to
understand the intentions of the subject, asking, "What do you mean by X?" For
either school of thought, however, queries of meaning have traditionally been in the
form of "What is X?"
Traditional theories of meaning that place meaning either within the subject or
the object are really two sides of the same coin. Both arise from the premise of a
distinction between the "inner" world and the "outer" world. They presume a
distinction between the subject and object. Those who search for essential criteria for
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meaning presume that objects are "out there" waiting to be discovered. If they

~

with this distinction however, they are then challenged by the skeptic to explain how
it is that one can become free of one's conceptual taking-as in order to have access to
and knowledge about conceiver-independent reality (Moser, 1993). Those who doubt
whether one can free oneself of one's conceptualization have then turned to the
subject as the source of meaning. Thus, the meaning of an entity is what one
determines it to be.
The important point, however, is not the disagreement that has ensued over
whether meaning originates within either the subject or the object, or whether one can
or cannot have access to conceiver-independent reality. The important point is the
ontological premise that grounds these disagreements. When one

be~ins

with a

distinction between the inner and the outer world (between the subject and the object),
one is necessarily committed to a theory of meaning that says meaning is

~

objective QI subjective. This beginning premise has furthermore committed
philosophers either to a quest for the kind of certainty that can never be attained QI a
kind of relativism and indeterminacy that makes some uncomfortable (Bernstein,
1983; Hacking, 1988; Moser, 1993).

According to Bernstein (1983), it is our

"Cartesian Anxiety" that underlies this debate. This anxiety arises from the belief
that~

there is a secure foundation for knowledge (and meaning) QI we become

lost in the "chaos" of relativism. And so, the objectivist believes that there must be
some fixed, stable anchor to which we can appeal for knowledge, while the relativist
believes that the only anchors are those we create and accept.
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Traditional views of meaning--indeed the meaning of meaning--can be
criticized on both meta-epistemological and ontological grounds. More importantly for
this present study, however, thinking about

meaning~

in terms of "What is X?"

can be further criticized on pragmatic grounds. While theories of meaning that
answer "What is X?" questions can and do tell us something about a term's meaning,
(i.e. "What is restraint?") these theories do not provide a horizon for answering
questions about the meaning of an experience, i.e.

~

restrained.

To that end, an

alternative to traditional theories of meaning must be pursued. This chapter will
begin with a review of the literature on restraint. This review will begin broadly,
looking at the various uses of the concept and will conclude with the relevant research
related to restraining hospitalized patients. From this, it will become evident that
there is a significant dearth of knowledge about the patient's perspective of these
restraining practices. Finally, this chapter will conclude with the theory of meaning
that underpinned this study.
Review of the Literature
What is Restraint?
Within nursing, concept analyses have traditionally been the methodology used
to answer our "What is X?" questions (Chinn & Jacobs, 1983, 1987; Chinn &
Kramer, 1995; Walker & Avant, 1988). These methods have originated from
theories of meaning that assume that an entity's essence was stable and existed
independently from our conceptualizations. These methods assume that meaning is
objective. Therefore, if one wants to know what is meant by X, one looks for and
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aims at delineating those essential features that constitute that entity. From these
essential features, one then obtains a "real" definition, i.e. a notion of what the thing
~is,

in itself, out there (Hempel, 1952). This is deemed useful because once one

articulates these features, one is then able to pick out an object as an example of X.
In other words, "criteria will not precisely define the concept but rather will provide

guidelines for determining whether or not the reality basis for the concept exists in a
given situation" (Chinn & Jacobs, 1983, p. 87).
This view of meaning as essence may be objected to on meta-epistemological
grounds (Moser, 1993). According to this objection, there are no non-circular criteria
for determining how one might know that one has satisfactorily delineated

~

essence

of X. "How is it possible," the skeptic asks, "to have access to and knowledge about
an entity?" "How is it possible," the skeptic asks, "to step out of one's own
conceptualizations to know what a thing is?" Furthermore, "how does one know that
anything really exists out there, separate from us?" In an effort to answer these
questions, philosophers have sought an Archimedean point--a foundation for
knowledge that requires no further justification. Influenced by logical positivism, the
sciences sought this foundation in that which is "given" to the senses. Therefore,
definitions were reduced to observation sentences. Concepts that could not be
reduced to "observables" were considered not meaningful. Thus in nursing, the goal
of concept analyses became one of obtaining an operational definition. And the focus
for the concept analysis became one of measurement of the concept.
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Wittgenstein (1953/1968) was one philosopher who criticized theories of
meaning that assumed stable, essential criteria as constitutive of the entity. Likewise,
he rejected theories of meaning that privileged the subject. He saw meaning as a
relation between the subject and the object. Rather than assume fixed criteria and
sharp boundaries between what an entity is and what it is not, he said one should
"look and see." "Don't say 'there .DlllS.t be something common, or they would not be
called "games"'--but J.QQk

and~

whether there is anything common to all ... don't

think, but look!" (Wittgenstein, 1953/1968, p.31). He said one might find instead,
that the similarities are more like relationships, something more akin to "family
resemblances." Rather than identify rules for the use of a term, one might instead
point to certain cases, or paradigms and say,

"I.bll is what I mean by such and

such."
In keeping with Wittgenstein's directive to look and see, the restraint literature

was reviewed broadly. This review included general literature, psychology, law and
economics, as well as medicine and psychiatry. Despite these varied uses, there were
commonalities. In general, one can say that to be restrained involves one holding
oneself back or being held back from some action that has been determined by
someone to be harmful. Restricting a person's freedom of movement is generally
justified by a perceived larger good that may be very specific, as in protecting a
person from harm, or more universal, as in protecting a society from harm. In
addition to holding one back from certain activities, some forms of restraint or some
restraining practices may more subtly constrain one, i.e. they may compel one liU&t
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in a certain manner. For example, the threat of punishment may restrain one or
inhibit one from acting aggressively, but the

~

of restraint may more subtly be

seen as forcing one to ag in a particular way.
Non-medical uses of restraint
In psychology, the concept restraint has been used theoretically to explain

eating disorders (Klesges, Klem, Epkins & Klesges, 1991; Ruderman, 1986; Wardle,
1990), certain patterns of drinking (Bensley, 1991; Bensley, Kuna & Steele, 1988;
Curry, Southwick & Steele, 1987), aggression (Dipboye, 1977; Dunand, Berkowitz &
I.eyers, 1984; Feldman, Rubenstein & Rubin, 1988; Feldman & Wentzel, 1990; Ho,
1990; Wentzel, Feldman & Weinberger, 1991) and suicide (Davis & Short, 1977).
The theory of eating restraint states that eating patterns are influenced by the
desire for food and the efforts to resist that food. When these efforts to resist food
are relaxed, paradoxical overeating can result. Restraint, then is defined as a
cognitively mediated effort to resist eating. The theory of drinking restraint is similar
to eating restraint. Restrained drinkers are preoccupied with controlling their alcohol
intake. These individuals experience psychological conflict between desiring to drink
and resisting this desire. Consequently, these drinkers are apt to engage in a restraint
and binge cycle of drinking.
Restraint can be seen as one controlling one's aggressive impulses (Dunand, et
al., 1984; Feldman, et al., 1988; Feldman & Wentzel, 1990; Wentzel, et al., 1991).
In studies of family relationships, achievement and self-restraint (Feldman, et al.,

1988; Feldman & Wentzel, 1990; Wentzel, et al., 1991), those individuals with self-
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restraint could regulate their own behavior, thereby balancing their own personal
needs with those of others. Restraint-related skills were considered to be those skills
associated with social adjustment--such as controlling one's impulses and adhering to
rules. In a study of the audience effects of viewing aggressive movies (Dunand, et al.,
1984), the authors concluded that individuals learn to control their behavior by
socializing with others. The theory underpinning this study proposed a correlation
between viewing aggressive movies and a subsequent disinhibiting of and acting upon
the viewer's aggressive feelings.
In all of these studies, the restraining effect seemed to be something within the
person that controls or inhibits certain impulses and desires. Stovall (1931), in
discussing the poet Shelley, described Shelley's conflict between his desires
(gratifying his own physical appetites) and barriers to these desires. In this context,
restraining practices were either internal or external inhibitors of behavior. Internal
restraints were those internal inhibiting activities that are one's own. External restraints were those inhibiting practices that are imposed upon individuals through
laws, customs or convention. Desires were seen as either egoistic or altruistic,
promoting one's own well-being or promoting the well-being of others and society.
Life, according to the author, is balancing these desires with restraint.
There are social practices that seem to have a restraining effect on individuals.
For example, in Davis & Short's (1977) study of restraint in relation to suicide,
suppressing one's urge to commit suicide occurs when a person identifies with and
complies with the constraining influence of social structure or personal relationships.
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This external structure was hypothesized to influence the urge or desire to commit
suicide.
In a study of domestic violence in Asian women (Ho, 1990), the author

focused on the constraining influence of culture in relation to physical violence toward
Asian women. According to the author, Asian cultures value one restraining oneself,
i.e. holding back one's feelings and keeping one's behavior in check. When this
inhibiting effect is not present, physical aggression, especially toward the woman can
become violent and explosive. This problem of physical violence is compounded because Asian women are reinforced for enduring this hardship and not speaking up.
Therefore, they are apt to tolerate and remain silent about this abuse.
Black (1901) and MacDonald (1989) wrote about the relationship between
culture and restraint. The Christian church, by valuing restraining oneself, has
strongly influenced its members insofar as the members agree that self-denial
(fasting, celibacy and solitude) is an important part of one's quest for holiness. By
repressing oneself, present gratification is resisted for the sake of a larger good,
usually articulated as religious communion or holiness. In Western Europe, socially
imposed laws, primarily influenced by Christian ideology and/or group pressure,
reinforced restraining one's sexual behavior and attitudes, thereby reinforcing
monogamy. Black (1901) argued that only by disciplining oneself could one control
one's appetites and passions. He further argued that without discipline and restraint,
one's "animal" instincts would be undirected and the order of life destroyed.
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Dipboye (1977) theorized that individuals who feel a loss of identity and
individuality in society will no longer feel that society's constraining effects. This
loss of identity releases, according to the author, the "violent" or "primitive" side of
human nature, resulting in (1) decreasing concern for how the person appears to
others, (2) lowering of self-consciousness and (3) weakening self-control. This was
thought to result in increasing aggression, sexual deviance and vandalism.
Governmental practices may also restrain another's activities. For example
child restraining devices, manufactured for the transporting of children under the age
of five in motor vehicles equipped with seat belts, restrict the freedom of movement
of these children. Since they do restrict the freedom of the child, the constitutionality
of the use of these restraining devices has been questioned (Regan, 1982). The
courts have decided, however, that protecting the child from injury supersedes restricting the freedom of the child because the young child cannot appreciate the
dangers of unrestrained travel. A child of this young age is therefore not able to
make an independent decision.
Restraints of trade (Attorneys General, 1985; Hamilton, 1985; Kintner, 1980)
are those legal agreements that restrict one party from either followin& an occupation,
industry or trade or conductin2 the industry in a particular. manner or place.
Restraining trade is an attempt to limit, obstruct, control or eliminate competition in a
given market. Restraints of trade are also those agreements, such as tariffs or import
quotas, that constrain the free flow of trade in the international market. The purpose
is restricting the flow of trade across international markets.
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Cole (1983) discussed governmental practices that restrain science. By
prohibiting certain activities or by dictating which ideas are followed and which are
censured, the activity of the scientific community is constrained. Likewise, there are
governmental practices that attempt to prevent the writing, publication or circulation
of so-called objectionable material, thereby censoring reading (Gellhorn, 1956). The
proponents of these constraining practices argued that censoring actually preserves
freedom because it reinforces "true" values and beliefs, whereas those who oppose
these practices see censoring as jeopardizing one's freedom. Finally, Howard (1979)
discussed those governmental practices that attempt to control and limit war. Discipline in relation to war was considered necessary to protect countries from random
violence or total destruction. Therefore, these restraining practices were thought to
moderate war.
Medical Restrainin& of Patients
In both the descriptive and research literature related to restraining medical
and psychiatric patients there was no consistent definition for restraint. In addition to
four-way leather restraints, other means considered to be restraints were posey vests
(Anderson & Reeves, 1991; Guirguis & Durost, 1978; Moss & LaPuma, 1991;
Robbins, Boyko, Lane, Cooper & Jahnigan, 1987; Strumpf & Evans, 1988),
"holding" (Dabrowski, Frydman & Zakowska-Dabrowska, 1986; Westermeyer &
Kroll, 1978), strait-jackets (Dabrowski et al, 1986; Way, 1986), forced medications
(Anderson & Reeves, 1991; Dabrowski, et al., 1986; Fann & Linton, 1972; Jeffries
& Rakoff, 1983; Rapp, 1987), cold wet packs (Kilgalen, 1972; Ross, Lewin, Salzberg
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& Brooks, 1988; Singh, 1986), abdominal belts (Dabrowski, et al., 1986; Guirguis &

Durost, 1978), geriatric chairs (Guirguis & Durost, 1978; Moss & LaPuma, 1991;
Strumpf & Evans, 1991), electro-convulsive therapy (Jeffries & Rakoff, 1983), mitts
(Guirguis & Durost, 1978; Strumpf & Evans, 1991), cribs (Guirguis & Durost,
1978), PADS (preventive aggressive devices) (Van Rybroek, Kuhlman, Meier &
Kaye, 1987; Lion, 1987), sheets (Dabrowski, et al., 1986; Guirguis & Durost, 1978;
Way, 1986) and chains (Westermeyer and Kroll, 1978). In general, to restrain a
patient meant that one used some kind of device to severely limit the bodily
movement of another person.
Most of the research on restraining patients has focused on the reasons for
restraining them, most often cited as protecting the patient or others from harm. In
the psychiatric research, patients were most often restrained in response to an act of
violence or threat of violence that the patient has directed at either self or others
(Bornstein, 1985; DiFabio, 1981; Guirguis & Durost, 1978; Phillips & Nasr, 1983;
Sheridan, et al., 1990; Soloff, 1978, 1979; Way, 1986), thereby concluding that the
patient is out of control (Outlaw & Lowery, 1995). In the geriatric literature,
restraining patients was seen as a way to protect the patient from injury-- either from
falling or from wandering into dangerous situations (Berland, Wachtel, Kiel,
O'Sullivan & Phillips, 1990; Burton, German, Rouner, Brant, & Clark, 1992;
Ramprogus & Gibson, 1991; Robbins, et al., 1987; Strumpf & Evans, 1988; Tinetti,
Lui, & Ginter, 1992) . Other reasons that were given for restraining patients were:
violating the rules, manipulating the staff, behavioral regression (Soloff, 1978; 1979),

29
agitation (DiFabio, 1981; Guirguis & Durost, 1978; Way, 1986), disruptive behaviors
(Berland et al., 1990) and pulling out equipment such as intravenous lines (Robbins et
al., 1987; Strumpf & Evans, 1988).
Both the psychiatric researchers and the gerontological researchers have
attempted to identify characteristics of the patient that might predict who was most
likely to require physical restraining. Because of the differences in settings,
populations and methodologies and the absence of control groups, however, it is
difficult to extract any meaningful conclusions. With some hesitancy, one can conclude that the persons who are most likely to be physically restrained on psychiatric
units were young, psychotic males, who have a history of aggression (Bornstein,
1985; Carpenter et al., 1988; DiFabio, 1981; Phillips & Nasr, 1983; Roper et al.,
1985; Sheridan et al., 1990; Way & Banks, 1990). Patients who were physically
restrained on the psychiatric units were most often diagnosed as schizophrenic (Phillips & Nasr, 1983; Roper et al., 1985; Sheridan et al., 1990), but in many cases
either no diagnostic criteria were identified, or different criteria from study to study
were used to diagnose the patient.
Dementia seems to also predict who will be physically restrained in both the
psychiatric (Carpenter et al., 1988) and the nonpsychiatric settings (Berland et al.,
1990; Burton et al., 1992; Lofgren et al., 1989; Robbins et al., 1987; Tinnetti et al.,
1991). Persons who were physically restrained on nonpsychiatric units tended to be
older, female, cognitively impaired, dependent with regard to activities of daily living
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and have a history of falls (Berland, et al., 1990; Burton et al., 1992; Lofgren et al.,
1989; Tinetti et al., 1991).
Roitman, Orev & Schreiber (1990) reviewed the six-year records of restrained
patients to determine whether there was any annual rhythm to violence in these
hospitalized psychiatric patients. Of these 551 patients, they found that there was no
correlation with the photoperiod in nonaffective disorder patients, while the patients
with affective disorders seemed to have a circannual rhythm that peaked in June and
December.
·There were two studies that examined the social structure of the psychiatric
unit and its relation to the practice of physically restraining patients. Morrison
(1990a), using grounded theory methodology, explored the relationship between
organizational factors and violence. One of her findings was that a practice she called
"reciprocity" was used by the more experienced staff in order to socialire newer staff
members into restraining patients. She found that in situations of potential violence,
newer staff members would request assistance from certain experienced staff members
she called "enforcers." If, however, these newer staff members decided that, rather
than restrain the patients, they would talk to the patient in order to calm the patient
down, the "enforcers" would "retaliate" in the future by not responding to the staff
member's call for help, thus leaving that staff member open to potential assault. The
author concluded that staff members were thus "socialized" to restrain, rather than
use alternative methods to deescalate the patient.
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Fisher (1995) had a similar finding in her study of a locked commitment unit
and a forensic unit. She described the tension that staff feel between "doing the right
thing" and getting along with coworkers. The participants in her study said that when
they used less restrictive interventions, other staff often labeled them "as
inexperienced, as victims of manipulation, or as not acting as a team member"
(Fisher, 1995, p. 202). Thus, these staff members felt that if they challenged the unit
norms, they risked not being supported during times of dangerousness. The dominant
culture of control was therefore, reinforced.
Kalogjera, Bedi, Watson & Meyer (1989) measured the number and duration
of secluding and restraining episodes for a five month period preceding and following
the implementation of a "therapeutic management" protocol. This protocol consisted
of identifying stages of aggressive behavior and utilizing specific interventions during
each of these stages. The authors found that despite an increase in the patient to staff
ratio, there was a significant decrease in the number of restraining episodes, as well
as a decrease in the actual number of patients who required restraining and seclusion.
There were two studies that included as part of a larger design, an assessment
of the patient's responses to or perspective of the restraint experience. Sheridan et
al., (1990) briefly interviewed all patients who were physically restrained on a
psychiatric unit between 1987 and 1988. From this data, they concluded that 66% of
these patients had good recall of the actual event. Of these patients (N =48), 39
perceived that being restrained was a consequence of conflict between either staff or
other patients. The nature of the conflict and how it resulted in being physically
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restrained were not discussed by the authors, however. Twenty-two patients recalled
paranoid or delusional thinking prior to being restrained. Forty-one percent had a
"positive" response, stating that being physically restrained calmed them and fifty-one
percent had a "negative" response, saying that they were angry or frightened. The
patients suggested that better communication or discharge could have prevented their
being physically restrained.
Strumpf & Evans (1988) briefly interviewed, again as part of a larger study,
twenty medical patients who had been physically restrained. Categories of responses
to the restraining experience included anger, fear, resistance, humiliation, demoralization, discomfort, resignation, denial and agreement. The patients offered the
following alternatives to being restrained: increasing the numbers of staff, more
explanations by staff, easier access to the bathroom, more diversionary activities and
discharge from the hospital.
There were three studies that focused on the nurses' responses to restraining
the patient. One (Scherer, Janell, Kanski, Neary, & Morth, 1991), administered
questionnaires to staff in a nursing home. The authors concluded from the responses
that the staff were not conflicted about the practice of restraining patients. One must
be cautious, however, about drawing conclusions from this study, as the response rate
was very low--21 % of the nursing assistants, 19% of the of the LPN's and 17% of
the RN's. In addition, the tool itself was subject to social desirability bias. Staff
usually know what the "right" answer is to the question of why and when physical
restraining devices should be used. It would take careful construction to develop a
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tool that elicits actual attitudes and feelings about restraining patients. DiFabio (1981)
and Quinn (1993) both interviewed staff to elicit feelings about restraining patients.
Both authors concluded that staff acknowledge the need for restraining patients, but
experienced distress with their use.
The only psychiatric research that focused primarily on the outcome of
restraining patients was Sheridan et al. (1990). The authors concluded that neither the
positive or negative responses of the patient predicted the number of hours actually
physically restrained or the number of subsequent restraining episodes. These findings did not support their hypothesis that the patient's attitude toward being restrained
would influence subsequent behavior. The authors suggested that some patients view
being restrained as a deterrent to aggressive behavior, while others found being
restrained "rewarding." The authors further concluded that alternative interventions
were needed for those patients who found the experience rewarding.
In the gerontological research, there have been studies to determine whether
the practice of physically restraining patients increases or decreases agitation and
whether this practice increases or decreases the number of serious falls. There seems
to be some indication that the practice of physically restraining patients increases the
patient's agitation (Werner, Cohen-Mansfield, Braun & Marx, 1989) and, rather than
decrease the number of serious falls, may in fact increase the number of serious falls
(Tinetti, et al., 1992).
Lofgren et al.(1989), in a prospective study of restraining patients on a
medical service, concluded that the patients who were restrained longer, had a higher
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rate of nosocomial infections and pressure sores. Patients who were restrained also
had a higher rate of in-hospital deaths. Given, however, that these patients also had
more diagnoses, they may have been more acutely ill than patients who did not
require restraining.
Of interest in terms of outcome of the practice of restraining patients is some
of the animal research related to stress. In these studies, the use of these physical
restraining devices (harnesses, wire meshes, pens or small, Plexiglas cylinders) were
used to elicit the stress response, thus enabling the researcher to measure hormonal
activation (Becker et al., 1989; Imperato, Angelucci, Casolini, Zocchi & PuglisiAllegra, 1992; Sigg, Keim & Sigg, 1978) and its relation to healing (Derr, 1981),
immunosuppression (Flores, Hernandez, Hargreaves & Bayer, 1990; Zwilling et al.,
1990) and the development of gastric ulcers (Gaudin, Safar & Cuche, 1990; Lanum,
Campbell, Blick, Knox & Wheeler, 1984; Wyrwicka & Garcia, 1979) in these
animals. Despite the differences in the hypotheses and the outcomes of these studies,
the general consensus seemed to be that physically restraining these animals is a
stressor that activates the hypothalamo-pituitary adrenal axis (Pare & Glavin, 1986).
Lanum et al. (1984), using a Learned Helplessness Model, immobilized rats for 0, 2,
8, 14, or 18 hours. Following the episode of being restrained, they then observed the
rats' behavior and concluded that the restrained rats learned more slowly and had an
overall decrease in their activity.
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Sec!udin~

the Patient

Although one can argue that the practice of secluding patients is conceptually
different than the practice of restraining patients, it is relevant to this study for two
reasons. The first is that in some of the descriptive literature, as well as the research
literature, secluding patients is considered to be a form of restraint. Conceptually,
however, these two practices are different in that, although the secluded patients are
restricted, they continue to have free movement of their bodies. They are restricted
in space, not movement. On the other hand, secluding patients is related to
restraining patients in that there is a significant restriction imposed on one by another.
Another reason that the seclusion research is relevant is that there have been some
qualitative studies of the patient's experience of being secluded. In these studies,
patients were either (1) interviewed, using brief, structured interviews (Binder &
McCoy, 1983; Norris & Kennedy, 1992; Plutchik, Karasu, Conte, Siegal & Jerrett,
1978) or (2) given questionnaires (Soliday, 1985; Tooke & Brown, 1992) whereby the
patients were asked to identify their perceptions and feelings about being secluded. In

all of these studies, patients overall felt negatively about being secluded, saying that
they felt angry, anxious, powerless, confused, sad, frustrated, resentful, or other such
negative feelings. In these studies, however, some of the patients felt positively about
the experience, saying that being secluded helped calm them down, keep them safe,
or comfort them.
In another qualitative study of the seclusion experience (Wadeson &
Carpenter, 1976), researchers on a National Institute of Mental Health research unit
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analyzed the patients' art. The researchers found that although they had not
specifically asked these patients to draw pictures of the seclusion experience, they
often did. These researchers reported that even at one year follow-up, the patients
felt bitter about being secluded and that this bitterness influenced the patient's
perception of the entire hospitalization. Since these patients were often not
medicated, their drawings were often of their hallucinations and delusions while they
were secluded. The hallucinations tended to be pleasurable and comforting, whereas
the delusions tended to be unpleasant, terrifying and often persecutory. For these
patients, being secluded was perceived as punishment for some unknown crime. In
general, these patients tended to have intense, negative feelings about this experience.
Summary of the Review of the Literature
There seems to be then, a balance between restraining oneself and being
externally restrained. If, for some reason, a person actually has or is believed to
have diminished ability to control oneself, either naturally or as a result of
circumstances, society (large or small) will, in an effort to constrain that person, exert
more of its own external control through the use of some kind of threat or force. If a
particular society fears that an individual will lose control more effort will be exerted
to constrain that person.
Therefore, being in control does not merely describe behavior. There is a
normative component to it. Individuals, as members of a larger culture, place at least
some degree of importance on being in control. Individuals, as part of societies and
cultures, form some consensus as to which behaviors qualify as an indication that one
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is in control or out of control. In that sense being in control or being out of control
are relative concepts. There is no one standard to measure being in control. Control
therefore, cannot be understood in isolation or as separate from the person and the
tradition out of which that person emerges. The importance one places on maintaining control is intertwined with a particular society's notion of the nature of the
person, in relation to a balance between expecting one to restrain oneself and the need
for one to be restrained by others. Therefore, different cultures develop their own
methods to handle individuals whom its members view as out of control.
Psychiatric nurses have a long history of being with patients who are losing
control and with assisting them in regaining control, yet little is known about the
practices of restraining patients. Psychiatric nurses, as part of their everyday practice
must evaluate whether patients are in control or out of control. At times this
determination is fairly clear. But, at other times that fine line between being in
control and being out of control becomes fuzzy. That point at which the patient has
lost self-control is not entirely clear. Listen to the words of an experienced
psychiatric nurse:
See, that was the fine line... On the unit, when no one was watching him, he
was crazy as can be. But then, when we asked him to take a look at his
behavior and work on it, he was able to do that. .. We could wait until the
middle of the day and see if he acts out a little more ...
The dilemma for the psychiatric nurse becomes one of trying to determine
when to "leap in" and take over for the patient who is losing control and when to
"leap ahead," allowing the patient to utilize his or her own resources, accompanying
the patient in the effort to regain control. This is a difficult decision because, if a
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nurse prematurely leaps in and restrains the patient, the danger is one of domination
(Heidegger, 1927/1962). The experienced nurse says:
Sometimes I've gotten the impression that when patients are behaving
bizarrely, but not self-destructively, that sometimes the nurses feel that they
have a responsibility to stop that behavior because its bizarre... That they have
some responsibility in controlling that behavior.
The other risk the psychiatric nurse must face is not leaping in when there are
potential conditions of dangerousness, e.g. when a person is losing control and the
safety of the unit is in jeopardy. These may be the times when patients welcome
others leaping in and taking over. The ideal circumstance would be to "be with" the
patient who is losing control in order to give the patient space, time and an
opportunity to regain control. This same nurse describes how this might look:
Wouldn't a patient benefit from you saying, "We were making a decision to
put you into restraints because we felt that you needed something to
calm ... [for you] to be calm. But you showed us that you could get back into
control so I'm glad" ... And talk it over... Talk to the patient about what worked
and what didn't. ..
These are the everyday practices of the nurse on a psychiatric unit, trying to
maintain safety with patients who vary in their ability to restrain their own behavior
and consequently are at risk for losing control. The psychiatric staff also vary in
their ability to "be with" the patient whose behavior is escalating out of control.
Likewise, they vary in their ability to leap ahead and deescalate a patient who is
losing control. Those who are less skilled in distinguishing when an individual
patient is losing control and less deft at deescalating the patient often depend on the
structure of a more restrictive environment to maintain control of the patients. Aside
'

from the impact of this restrictive environment on the person, there seems to be at
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least some evidence that these highly restrictive environments actually increase the
potential for violence. This, then, results in a cycle of tighter controls which can
contribute to an increase in aggressive acting out (Morrison, 1990 a,b; Morrison,
1994).
Although typically conceptuaH:red as such, restraining oneself or being
restrained is not simply an isolated act or an event. It occurs within a context.
Expectations of self-control and assumptions about an individual's ability to selfcontrol emerge from societal, cultural and religious customs. Thus, a particular
society (such as a psychiatric unit) establishes practices that convey to its members
which behaviors are acceptable and which are unacceptable. How a society views a
person determines the relative balance between the need to exert external control and
an expectation of internal control. If an individual is deemed to be unable or
unwilling to control one's own behavior, society will exert more external control. If
a particular society fears the consequences of decreased self-control, more external
control will also be exerted.
This review of the literature has provided us with a background understanding
of the practices of restraining, i.e. What is restraint? When is it used? Why is it used?
What is missing from the literature, however, is the meaning of this state of being
restrained (for one). This absence has occurred primarily because this practice has
(for the most part) been studied within a tradition that views phenomena objectively
and as separated (in a way to be specified) from human interests. Scientific inquiry
typically requires a change-over from the practical to the theoretical. In this change-
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over, practical activity (praxis) disappears and likewise, the lens through which one
views the phenomenon also changes. For example, in practical activity, i.e. when
one is using a tool, one may comment about the tool's heaviness or lightness and
easiness or difficulty in handling. Heaviness or lightness, however, only have
relevance in relation to using the tool, e.g. it is too light to do the job. While the
tool's heaviness or lightness is related to certain properties of the tool (its weight),
one can still talk about these properties even when the tool is taken out of this
context. In fact, the properties are all that one can talk about. Any talk about the
tool's lightness or heaviness no longer has relevance. Thus, when the tool is removed
from the context in which it is used, its "tool-character and "world-point" (its place
in someone's world) are both overlooked (Heidegger, 1927/1962).
This viewpoint that the entities one studies are objects that are inerely present
is exemplified in the reported research about restraining patients. This research has
primarily sought to identify properties about the restrained person (sex, age,
diagnosis, previous history) as if that person was merely present as an object might
be. In this kind of research, not only is the person taken out of context, but the
person is objectified. This research comes out of a paradigm that (1) assumes the
world is structured and ordered and that it behaves in a predictable way, (2) assumes
that the world can be broken down into distinct, separate variables (Allen, Benner,
Diekelmann, 1986) and (3) attempts to control the context by (a) controlling the
situation in which the experiment is conducted, (b) controlling who receives a certain
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treatment or (c) controlling the procedures in order to control threats to valid
inference (Cook & Campbell, 1979).
To say that the practice of restraining patients has meaning to those involved is
to say, however, that this practice occurs within a context. Therefore, to study the
meaning of this experience, one must study this experience utilizing a paradigm that
embraces context, rather than controls context. According to Heidegger, what an
entity

i.a or "the beingness of beings is not something 'out there' in beings but rather

is the meaningful relatedness, the intelligible presentness, of things to and for man"
(Sheehan, 1981b, p. x). Heidegger's central problematic, however, is not the being of
entities (the presence of entities to one), but the being of being (what makes
meaningful presence possible). He is interested in the meaning of being. Heidegger,
by articulating what he calls a fundamental ontology, has thus opened up the
possibility of an alternative methodology for the study of meaning.
Heide&&er and Meanin&
Meaning, according to Heidegger, does not reside in a word or within an
entity. Nor is meaning something that a person simply prQjects onto an entity. When
entities have "come to be understood--we say they have meanin& (Sinn)" (Heidegger,
1927/1962, p.192), but, strictly speaking, it is not the meaning that is understood, but
the entity (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 192). For Heidegger, meaning "is that from
which something is understandable as the thing it is," (King, 1964, p.7) where the
that-from-which is "a world of human existence" (King, 1964, p. 7). In other words,
it is only from a human world of purposes that an entity can be understood M
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something that is relevant to one. Therefore, meaning is the center of reference
around which the understandability of an entity is organized (Caputo, 1987).
Accordingly, Heidegger asserts that meaning emerges because of the way
human beings relate to the entities they encounter that is passible because of the
particular structure of human beings. Heidegger calls this way of relating to entities
"being-in-the-world" and the structure of human beings ".sQW," usually translated as
"care." Fundamentally, however, it is temporality that gives meaning to this structure
and how we relate to both ourselves and other entities. Since humans are finite, they
are always ahead-of-themselves, living into possibility. Thus, finitude makes it both
possible and necessary that humans will form a world of purposes (King, 1964).
Bein&-in-the-World
Being-in-the-world is a unitary phenomenon that Heidegger uses to capture the
sense of how humans are in relation to other entities. Being-in, therefore, is not a
spatial relation, but indicates the way that human beings dwell among other entities
(both human and nonhuman) in a familiar world (Heidegger, 1927/1962). This
implies a certain kind of involvement with these entities. "It is a profound intimacy of
[one] with the world, by reason of which other beings that are within the world may
be 'encountered', sc. reveal themselves for what they are" (Richardson, 1963, p.52).
Therefore, these entities (things, experiences/events) do not simply exist out there in a
detached manner. Human beings have an interest and investment in them. Being-inthe-world discloses these entities as meaningful and relevant.
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Practical world. Heidegger, in order to uncover the structure of being (how
entities are meaningfully present to one), begins his analysis with "everyday,"
practical activity (taking-as-for) (Heidegger, 1927/1962). In this analysis, he
describes the way human beings actually encounter certain kinds of entities (tools,
~·

In one's everyday activity, one does not come upon these tools in a flat and

detached manner (as merely present, vorhanclen). Tools are not objects that are just
~.

In Heidegger's often cited example of hammering, Heidegger illustrates how

our usual way of being-in-the-world is one of practical involvement. There, one does
not first-off weigh the hammer or identify the properties of the hammer. One uses it.
We know that we have some purpose for which we need a tool. We understand that
the tool, itself, would be useful for that purpose. Therefore, we pick up the tool and
use it.
Reflectively, when we observe someone who is engaged in such an activity, all
we "see" is the person's practical taking-as. In the hammering, the focus recedes
from the hammer itself such that the focus for the person

~

the tool is on the

work to be done. In the work to be done, then, the tool refers to something beyond
itself. "For example, the hammer will have its immediate destination in a
hammering, the hammering in a nailing, the nailing in building of house"
(Richardson, 1963, p.55). And, the house is to be built for so1J_1eone. The important
point that Heidegger is trying to illustrate in this example is that in our using the tool,
the related purposes (the "in-order-to's") and goals (the "for-which's") remain hidden

44
(in the background) and yet are present. The context that renders the instrument
meaningful recedes and remains implicit.
Waking up to world. There are, however, certain circumstances that will
explicate this hidden context. If, for instance, one is unfamiliar with one's
surroundings, one might have to think about one's purposes in relation to the entities
one encounters. At other times, the tool that one needs may be unavailable. Or the
tool may be broken or missing. One is then caught up short. And, suddenly, one
misses the item one needs and wakes up to the realimtion that one needed the item for
a particular purpose. Thus, the previously implicit purposes and goals now come into
the foreground. We wake up to world.
World. For Heidegger, world is not a "thing." It is not the totality of entities
that exist within the world. World is the context of involvements that give meaning
to the entities one encounters within one's individual world. World is a "matrix of
relationships" (Richardson, 1967, p. 291) from which entities are meaningful.
Consequently, because of our understanding of this contextual wholeness, entities are
not presented to us as isolated entities. The equipment and tools that we use are not
mere objects. They are disclosed to us within this contextual whole as interconnected
entities that are useful to our purposes (Heidegger, 1927/1962; 1983/1995).
Therefore, we can comport ourselves toward these entities in the world by producing
them and otherwise involving ourselves with them. And, while we cannot
comprehend the totality of all entities, we do comport ourselves in the midst of these
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entities as a whole. Thus, while our everyday existence may amx-ar fragmented, we
~always

dwelling within a unity of a whole (Heidegger, 1993).

Transcendence
As we have seen, one gm take and use an entity as a tool only because one
already knows entities as-being-for some purpose. "Man can get involved with an
entity only by being already beyond it, by having already understood it as for
something" (Sheehan, 1983, p. 303). Heidegger calls this being-already-beyond-it
transcendence. Thus, being-in-the-world ll transcendence. Therefore, as
transcendence, human beings already (necessarily) "step over" entities or go beyond
entities, thereby understanding the being of these entities. As transcendence, human
beings are already ahead of themselves, living into possibilities, thereby disclosing
entities as meaningful.
The Care Structure

Human beings exist as being-in-the-world. Thus, for Heidegger, being-in-theworld means being human. The ontological structure of being-in-the-world is care.
Therefore, being human ll care (Heidegger, 1927/1962; King, 1964; Sheehan, 1983;
1984; 1995a). And, the structure of care is to be

"already-out-ahead-in-~ssibilities

as being-present-to-entities" (Sheehan, 1983, p. 306). Although the care structure is
usually defined as three co-equal moments (existentiality, facticity and falling-inwith), the first two are really two sides of the same phenomenon (one's being alreadyahead into possibility) and thus may be collapsed into one moment. It is these two
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moments, as one, that then make the third moment (access to entities) possible. And,
it is temporality that both unifies and makes the care structure possible.
Existentiality. To be human is to be ahead of oneself, living into possibility.
"Man is never merely here and now like a thing, but is constantly out beyond
himself, relating himself, in the first place, not to other beings, but to his own abilityto-be" (King, 1964, pp.137-138). In other words, human beings are first-off
concerned with their own being, i.e., their own ability to be. We are beings for
whom our own being is an issue. (Heidegger, 1927/1962).
Facticity. To live ahead into possibility is not a choice that one makes,
however. To begin with, humans are not the origin of their own being. As human
beings, we are by virtue of being human, already (necessarily) moving into the
possible. We are thrown into being-in-the-world. To be thrown means that one finds
oneself in particular circumstances that are always present and influencing one.
Therefore, our possibilities are not unlimited possibilities. Our possibilities are
limited by (1) the culture or family that one is born into, (2) the reality that when one
chooses one possibility, one is not choosing another possibility and (3) the reality that
one will not live forever, thus limiting all possibility.
Fallint: in with. Thus, as entities who are already ahead of themselves in a
world, human beings find themselves in a world with other entities to which humans
are present to, but mostly absorbed with. "Man's already-ahead-ness holds open the
realm of intelligibility within which man has access to, and in everydayness is 'fallen
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into,' the things of his concern" Sheehan, 1981 p. xvi). Thus, the entities we
encounter in the world matter to us and are of concern to us.
Temporality
For Heidegger, temporality is not a distinct series of nows. Nor is it a
separate past, present and future. For Heidegger, temporality is a much more unified
phenomenon that grounds (makes possible) the care structure. Therefore, as one who
is ahead of oneself living into possibilities, one is becoming what one already is, i.e.
finite, mortal becoming. "For Heidegger, temporality connotes becoming, and human
temporality entails becoming oneself" (Sheehan, 1997, p. 4). Thus, this aheadness is
oriented toward an existential future--one's finitude that is concretized by one's death.
We are becoming our ownmost possibility (our finitude).
As one who is ahead of oneself living into possibilities, however, one is
becoming what one already and essentially is (Sheehan, 1981). This alreadiness,
which is usually interpreted as one's past, connotes that which is "always prior to and
beyond our determination" (Sheehan, 1995a, p.217). Thus, one goes out toward the
possibility of one's finitude and comes back to and accepts what one already is (finite
mortal becoming). This movement discloses not only our selves, but the entities we ·
encounter as meaningful. In other words, "man as 'excess' (ahead of himself and
already in a world) holds open the area of access to (or intelligibility of) beings"
(Sheehan, 1981, p. xv). Thus, the entities we encounter are made present to us.
Temporality, therefore, makes both being-in-the-world and our understanding of being
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possible (Sheehan, forthcoming). Temporality is the horizon from which an entity is
understandable or intelligible as the entity it is.
Conclusion
Finitude, then, is the condition for the possibility that humans will have a
world, i.e. that we have a matrix of relationships out of which the entities we
encounter are revealed to us as meaningful. In other words, as humans, we are
always incomplete. Thus, there is always lack or need that will pull us along (so to
speak) or draw us in, toward a completeness that can never be attained.
To ask "What can I. .. ?" is to ask "What can I not?," hence to betray an
essential limitation; to ask "What should I. .. ?" implies not only "What should
I run?" (therefore negativity) but also an intrinsic incompleteness; to ask
"What JDU I?" implies hope, therefore expectancy, therefore indigence. ·
(Richardson, 1963, p.32)
Therefore, to be human is to imply limitation and incompleteness. But, rather than
view this limitation as negative, this limitation may be seen as the dynamism that
thrusts us forward into possibility. Thus, as beings who are moving into possibility,
we have purposes, things matter and we comport ourselves concemfully with the
entities we encounter. We have an interconnected world.
As part of who we are as human beings, however, we tend to forget this
intrinsic finitude that is our dynamism. Thus, in our everydayness, we tend to think
that we do have unlimited possibilities and that we £an control everything. In
science, this forgetfulness is manifested in the quest for certainty. We think we £an
know everything and solve all problems. We focus our attention on an entity, itself,
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and neglect that which makes it present as it is. We forget that hiddenness is intrinsic
to disclosure (Sheehan, 1995b).

If, then, meaning recedes and remains hidden, the question for a research
study about meaning is how to access those meanings. One of the assumptions of this
study is that meanings are embedded in the stories that people tell. Therefore,
individuals who have been restrained were asked to tell a story about what happened
to them. It is then the task of the researcher to interpret or make explicit these
meanings. The methodology used to interpret these meanings was hermeneutic
phenomenology since "hermeneutics is the countermovement to the pull of
withdrawal, concealment and fallenness" (Caputo, 1987, p.63).

CHAPTER ill
METHODOLOGY

Introduction
Narratives or the telling of stories about the events in one's life, are a way that
one communicates to oneself or another the meaning of an event within the context of
one's life (Benner & Wrubel, 1989; Carr, 1986; Polkinghome, 1988; Sandelowski,
1991). In living these stories we are always interpreting our experiences. In that
sense, as human beings, we ark hermeneia. Thus, individual events acquire
significance within the whole to which they belong. Likewise, our individual stories
are related to a larger social context with which we are involved. Therefore, our
stories film come out of an historical tradition that we have inherited.
The stories that we tell reveal meaning, as well as a sense of organization, i.e.
how and whether an experience fits or doesn't fit within the context of our lives (our
own significances and involvements). Thus, this sense of organization or fitting
together implies that there is a coherence to how one's stories unfold. This fitting
together and sense of significance also means that experiences are context dependent.
Therefore, the events in one's life may be interpreted differently at different times
during one's life.
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Hermeneutic Pbenomenolo&Y
The question for this study, "What is the meaning of being restrained?" is not
simply a question about what happened, although that question will get answered.
This question is really a question about the way that the experience (of being
restrained) is present to those who have been restrained. In order to understand the
way the experience is present to one, we must also understand the meaning of the
experience (the person's referential context). In other words, we must understand
how the participants interpret this event within the context of their world.
Hermeneutic phenomenology (Allen, Benner & Diekelmann, 1986; Benner, 1994;
Polkinghome, 1988; van Manen, 1990) was the methodology employed for
uncovering this understanding.
Heidegger (1927/1962), drawing from the work of his teacher, Edmund
Husserl, saw hermeneutic phenomenology as a way to uncover and understand the
being of entities (the structure that make it possible for entities to be present to us in a
meaningful way). Phenomenology, according to Heidegger, is "the work of laying
open and letting be seen, [which is] understood as the methodologically directed
dismantling of concealments" (Heidegger, 1979/1985, p. 86). Therefore,
phenomenology, which derives its name from the Greek verb, phainesthai, meaning
"to show itself" (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 51) and the Greek word,

~'

meaning

"to make manifest what one is 'talking about'" (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 56), allows
something to show itself as it is. And, "that which shows itself, the manifest," is the
phenomenon (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p.51). Phenomenon, as derived from
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phainesthai, is further derived from phaino, which means "to bring to the light of
day, to put in the light" (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p.51). Thus, Heidegger tries to
capture the notion that an entity, as it moves from unintelligibility to intelligibility, is
no longer merely present among all other entities. It becomes present to one in a
meaningful way. As such, Heidegger talks about entities coming out into the open,
appearing, coming into the light or moving from concealment to unconcealment.
For this to happen, i.e. for an entity to become meaningfully present, there
must, however, be a structure that lets or makes it possible fin: this entity to come out
into the light and be meaningfully present. For Heidegger, this structure is the
structure of human beings--being already ahead, living into possibility. It is this
structure that makes all disclosure possible. Therefore, "'hermeneutics' in Heidegger
has less to do with interpreting texts than it does with revealing--within all forms of
human behavior--the often overlooked structure of being-in-a-world and the
hermeneutical understanding underlying predicative knowledge of entities" (Sheehan,
forthcoming, p.4).
Hermeneutics, which is derived from the Greek word heoneneia, means
"expression, manifestation, or communication" (Sheehan, 1988. p. 71). In its most
general form, hermeneia refers to any sort of communication, including animal
communication. More specifically, hermeneia can refer to human communication
about one's being-in-the-world. This is communication about one's practical world
that then conveys an understanding of something as-being-for a particular use. This
"as-being-for" is often referred to as the "hermeneutical-as" and may be disclosed
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preverbally through one's practical activity or verbally through language. Either way,
however, in this form of hermeneia, one is prepredicatively disclosing one's being-inthe-world. Therefore, "one can get involved with an entity only by being already
beyond it, only by having already understood it as being for something. This .. .is
what Heidegger called the 'hermeneutical as'" (Sheehan, 1988, p. 79). In its most
specific form, hermeneia refers to predicative disclosure in the form of declarative
sentences (this h that) (Sheehan, 1988). This is a more derivative form of
communication that distances one from one's practical being-in-the-world.
Thus, according to Heidegger, there is an intimate relationship between the
process of disclosing and the structure that underlies all forms of disclosure.
Heidegger, in trying to "discover something about the givenness (Qusia/parousia,) of
entities and about how human beings enact the givenness of entities" (Sheehan, 1988,
p. 68) asserts that it is human existence, as finite mortal becoming (thrown
projection), that makes any and all meaningful communication possible. Therefore,
"phenomenology taught Heidegger that Being means to be manifest, truth means
unconcealment and human existence is the clearing in which beings are manifest
(true)" (Zimmerman, 1986, p. 19).
Understandin& and Inter.pretation
Hermeneia in its most general form means the same as semainein, which
means "indicating something to another"(Sheehan, 1988, p.72). This is the same
meaning as the Latin word, inter.pretari, the connotation of which is "to lay out in the
clear" (Sheehan, 1988, p. 72). Thus we get our notion of hermeneutics as
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interpretation. For Heidegger, understanding is not a kind of cognition in the sense
that one might differentiate understanding from explaining and conceiving. That
which is understood "has the structure of somethin& as somethin&" (Heidegger,
1927/1962, p. 189) and the "as" constitutes the interpretation. Therefore, that which
is understood has the structure of the hermeneutical-as. For Heidegger, there are no
presuppositionless interpretations. All interpretations are grounded in fore-having,
fore-sight and fore-conception. Thus we do not come upon an entity and cast
meaning upon the entity. "We do not, so to speak, throw a 'signification' over some
naked thing which is present at hand .... The thing in question already has an
involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world, and this
involvement...gets laid out in the interpretation" (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 190-191).
Therefore, every interpretation presupposes that we already have a world, a particular
point of view and a way of conceiving that which is understood. And it is language
(speaking, hearing, as well as keeping silent) that discloses one's world and thus
makes shared understanding possible (Gadamer, 1960/1989). Communication
"creates the possibility of extendin& understanding by allowing us to share it with the
other who is not in a position to experience it himself" (Caputo, 1987, p. 73-74).

Gettin& the Story
Therefore, the general aim of phenomenological research is to provide an open
horizon for a phenomenon to emerge as it is understood and be communicated to
another. Since the aim of this study was to understand individuals' experiences, it
was assumed that those who have been restrained know more about the phenomenon

55
than the researcher (Gadamer, 1960/1989). Therefore, for this study, ten adult
individuals were recruited who (1) have had the experience of being physically
restrained in leather restraints, (2) remembered that experience and (3) were able and
willing to share their experiences. Elderly, demented individuals were not included.
The participants were referred for this study by the staff of two inpatient psychiatric
units. The participants were then invited to participate and if they agreed to
participate a mutually agreeable appointment was made for the interview.
Of the ten adults who agreed to participate, five were male and five were
female. Eight participants were Caucasian and two were African-American. For one
participant, this had been the first restraint experience, whereas the other participants
had been restrained more than once in their lives. The interviews themselves were
conducted using an unstructured format. Each interview began with the following
statement, which was a modified version of that developed by Nancy Diekelmann,
RN, Ph.D, FAAN, of the University of Wisconsin, Madison:
Tell me about a time, one that you'll never forget, when you were restrained
in leather restraints on a psychiatric unit. It could be a recent story, or one
from long ago. Please include as much detail as possible, and stay as much as
you can in the story, rather than analyzing the story. After you have given the
details, please describe why this story is important to you and what it means to
you. Your story will be tape recorded.
Tellini: the Story
In essence, the participants were asked to recall an instance of being restrained

that stood out in their minds. In the perspective that grounds this study, the
participants were not being asked to talk about an experience that was considered to
be over and done with. When a person remembers and retells a story, the story itself
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may have occurred in the past, but the "human 'past' lies not behind but in front of
mill (SZ 20) precisely by operating in and determining the structure of man's present

and future" (Sheehan, 1977, p. 306). In other words, when a person remembers
something that already took place, that experience, in shaping the person's future
possibilities, is made present to the person (Olafson, 1995). In phenomenological
research, then the researcher is interested in the past event, not as a description of
something that happened and is done with, but the researcher is interested in how the
experience is made present to the participant. Since the participant, by remembering
and retelling an experience, is interpreting and disclosing his or her understanding of
an experience, the researcher is not interested in objectively validating whether or not
the participants correctly remember what happened to them. The researcher is
interested in the participants' understanding of that experience as it continues to be
present in their lives.
Listenin~

to the Stoey

The interview, itself, may be viewed as a form of dialogue or conversation
between two people. As with any conversation, neither person knows what will
emerge. The aim of the interview, therefore, is to come to an understanding
(Gadamer, 1960/1989). At the end of the interview, the researcher should have an
increased understanding of the phenomenon being studied. But the participant by
virtue of being asked to think about and reflect back on the experience, may also
come to a new understanding of that experience.

57
Since the goal was to obtain a narrative account of the experience of being
restrained, I initially listened to the participant's story with as few interruptions as
possible. The participants decided where to begin the story. Consequently, it was not
always clear at the beginning of the story what ~ the story. Therefore, I was not
quick to refocus the participant if the conversation seemed to wander. It was only
when the conversation drifted far out of the story or into discussions of causal
explanations, generalizations and abstract interpretations that I refocused the
participant (Benner, 1994).
While listening to the story, I tried to get a sense of the experience from the
participant's perspective. Thus, I tried to remain open to what they were telling me,
continually asking myself, "Is the experience

like~

or is it like that?" Without

necessarily agreeing with the participant, I tried to understand how it came to be that
this participant person has formed his or her particular view. Thus, by listening and
being open to what I was hearing, I was able to transpose myself into the participant's
world--into the other's horizon (Gadamer, 1960/1989).
Once the story was told, I then asked the participant further questions in order
to obtain a clearer, deeper, richer description of what happened and how it happened.
It is by asking questions that the being of what is talked about is broken open

(Gadamer, 1960/1989). Questions open possibilities and keep them open. Questions
provide a sense of direction. In order to be able ask a question, one must want to
know something about something. And, one must know what one does not know.
Therefore, when one asks a question, it means that on the one hand the answer is not
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known. And yet, inevitably, the question also limits the boundaries of what is going
to be talked about. In this sense, asking a question implies an openness, as well as a
limitation. The threat, therefore, is that the researcher will too greatly limit the
boundaries by asking the participant questions that are too leading or too narrow in
focus.
Interpretin& the Story
The successful interview will yield a story about the events that have occurred
that will then provide the researcher with a coherent understanding of how and why
something happened. In other words, the datum is the story of what happened and
the analysis is the researcher organizing these events into meaningful themes
(Polkinghome, 1988). In order to be able to analyze the interview, the interviews
were transcribed verbatim, thus producing a written text.
The interpretation of the story is another disclosive event whereby the
researcher strives to extract the participants' understanding of the experience being
investigated (Gadamer, 1960/1989). To this end the researcher enters into a dialogue
with the text that involves further questioning and answering. The researcher not
only

~

certain questions of the text, but listens for questions that come out of the

text. Each--the researcher and the participants via the text--enters this dialogue with
prejudices and preconceptions. Rather than necessarily distance oneself from these
fore-conceptions, the researcher may use these fore-conceptions to increase the
understanding of the text.
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In the analysis of the text, the researcher must maintain a stance of openness

in relation to the text. The researcher must be open to hearing what the text is
saying. In that sense, an understanding of the text is

&iYm to the listener (Gadamer,

1960/1989). On the other hand, meaning is not always readily available. Meaning
also recedes and remains hidden. Thus the researcher must bring out or uncover
these meanings. The meanings must be taken out of their hiddenness. Thus, the goal
of the interpretation is to not simply retell the events as they happened, but to go
"beneath" what happened in order to extract an understanding of the meanings
disclosed by the text. Consequently, there may be multiple understandings of the
text. Since the researcher strives to present the voice of the participants, the
interpretation should be true to the text, in the sense that the interpretation has
emerged out of the text and can be supported by text (Benner, 1994).
Although the actual method used to analyze the texts of these interviews was a
modification of that described by Diekelmann, Allen and Tanner (1989) and recently
modified by Diekelmann (1995), it is important to remember that one does not obtain
an understanding of the text by following a linear set of steps. In the beginning, each
story was read in its entirety in order to obtain an overall understanding of the text. I
then identified common themes that emerged from the text. For each of the
interviews, I wrote an interpretation utilizing the themes that emerged from the text
and data from the text to support the themes, thus organizing the interviews into a
coherent story. Since there were often several stories embedded within the interview,
the aim at this point was to get the story straight. At this phase, the threat is· (1) that
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the researcher will not be true to the text, thus reading too much into the text by
either imposing the researcher's own bias onto the text or approaching the text from a
viewpoint that cannot be supported by the text, or (2) that the researcher will impose
theoretical categories onto the text. The themes should not be theoretical concepts,
but should emerge from the text and from the words of the participants. The themes
should~

that which is emerging.

Since each person comes from a tradition that forms one's thinking, there are
no presuppositionless interpretations. The researcher brings to both the interview and
the analysis certain expectations. But, these fore-projections must be revised as an
understanding of the person and the text deepens. Therefore, one may find that one's
fore-meanings are not be supported by the data. The text, then, must be allowed to
assert its own truth (Gadamer, 1960/1989). The researcher cannot hold onto one's
own fore-meanings and understand the meaning of another. To ensure that the
interpretations emerged from and were supported by the text, several interviews and
the written interpretations were shared with colleagues who were either familiar with
the method or with psychiatric nursing. We discussed any lack of clarity in the
interpretation or questions that arose from the interpretation, returning to the entire
text for clarification, if necessary. This dialogue with

colleagu~s

also served to

deepen my own understanding of the text.
With the subsequent interviews, I began a dialogue between the texts. This
involved moving back and forth between the parts of the individual texts, the whole of
the texts and the historical tradition (my own and the participants) out of which the
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understandings were emerging. This dialogue also included a dialogue between the
texts of the interviews and the texts of Heidegger and Foucault. Consequently, my
understanding of the text both deepened and went beyond what was concretely said by
the participants (Gadamer, 1960/1989). As my understanding of the participants
deepened, new meanings in the texts emerged. In this dialogue with the texts,
patterns of themes that were present across the texts also began to emerge. Finally,
these patterns were organized into a written, coherent whole, including sufficient text
to enable the reader to evaluate the findings.
Evaluating the Findings
Since all investigations are fraught with finitude, there can be no complete
understanding of the participants. There is also not

a correct interpretation of the

text. There can, however, be wrong interpretations--those that are unsupported by the
data and therefore, do not present a voice of the participant. Madison (1988) suggests
the following guidelines for evaluating an interpretation:
1.

The analysis must be coherent. It should present a unified picture and not
contradict itself, even though the text itself may be contradictory.

2.

The analysis should be comprehensive and should contain more than a
superficial understanding of the text.

3.

The analysis should bring out the underlying intention of the text, which is to
resolve a central problematic. Therefore, the interpretation should penetrate a
specific problem.
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4.

The interpretation should address all the questions that were posed in the
study. The interpretation should be thorou&h.

5.

The interpretation must il}prQPriate and should address any questions raised by
the text itself.

6.

The text must not be read out of its historical and cultural context. Therefore,
it must be contextual.

7.

While there must be a&reement between the interpretation and what the
participant says, a good interpretation will also disclose new perspectives.

8.

A good understanding will raise questions to stimulate further research. It
should be su&&estive.

9.

Ultimately, a good interpretation is validated by its potential to extend to the
future.
Protectin& the Participants
Approval for this study was obtained from the Institutional Review Board for

Protection of Human Subjects of Loyola University Chicago and from the Human
Investigation Committee at the participating institution. I met with potential
participants to explain the purpose of the study and to arrange for a time for the
interview. At the time of the interview I obtained written consent. The participants
were told that they were free to withdraw at any time and that they could stop the
interview at any time should they feel uncomfortable. Written consent to audiotape
was also obtained. A copy of the Information Sheet (Appendix A) was given to each
participant. They were also told that they might contacted a second time, should
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there be a need for clarification or more information. However, only one person was
contacted a second time. I then transcribed the interviews verbatim and removed any
identifying data from the written transcript. The transcripts were then numbered in
order to maintain confidentiality.

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS OF THE STUDY
Introduction
Although this was a study of the meaning of being restrained, it surprisingly
became a mode of access into the participants' world. On the one hand, this finding
should not have been a surprise. If one thinks of events in one's life as meaningful
within a context of significances, it makes sense that an event like being restrained
would be inseparable from the whole of being mentally ill. On the other hand, we
have inherited a tradition that attempts to compartmentalize and decontextualize
experiences. In that tradition, it makes sense that one would expect only to hear
about being restrained. After all,

1llit is the story one is looking for. In his

discussion of ethnographic allegory, Clifford (1994) defends the position that several
voices or stories are simultaneously revealed within a text. He cites as an example,
the story of a !Kung village woman giving birth. This story of giving birth is, on one
level, the description of particular cultural practices. On another level, however, the
story also tells of a common human experience--that of a woman who is giving birth
to a baby. On yet another level, the researcher's own account of doing fieldwork is
recounted, thus revealing a third voice. According to Clifford, "the outcome of an
encounter... cannot be rewritten as a subject-object dichotomy. Something more than
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explaining or representing the life and words of another is going on--something more
open-ended" (Clifford, 1994, p. 214).
This chapter is the reporting of three stories that are distinct yet intimately
connected. On the one hand, this chapter reveals the participants' stories of being
restrained--of the movement of power back and forth between the patient and the
staff. On a deeper level, however, this chapter reveals the voice of human beings
with mental illnesses. We will hear what their lives are like, struggling with being
constrained, wondering why it is

that~

have been thrown into this kind of existing.

To hear both of these stories, however, I needed to enter into the participants' world.
Because entering another's world cannot be separated from what was heard, a third
story will be told--that of the researcher getting the story and entering into the
participants' world.
Bein&-in-the-World
Unexpectedly, these stories did not always begin where one might expect.
Each person had a unique telling of the story. Each person had a unique way of
bringing me into his or her world. Listen as one participant (all of the names of the
participants have been changed in order to maintain confidentiality) begins her story
of being restrained:
"I'll tell you about the latest incident [being restrained]. My parents always
lived with my grandparents. A story and a half, a two-flat. And the first
husband [her grandmother's] was an abusive alcoholic. The second one was a
pedophile. Everybody else worked during the day ... He worked nights for the
railroad. He was home during the day. Before I even started kindergarten, he
would, you know, sexually molest me."
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She proceeded, then, to talk about the many years she was sexually abused and the
impact this abuse has had on her life. At one point in the interview when it seemed
that she was truly off the subject, she connected her being sexually abused to her
being restrained:
"He always wore this ring. A Mason ring. The Masons. I knew that it was
a Mason ring, but, I didn't know what the Masons stood for. And Saturday,
we had 0. T. open. And I was making a leather key chain. I was going to the
box, and they had these things that stamp leather. And, they had the usual
things--cats, dogs, frogs and mushrooms. All of a sudden, I saw this Mason
ring. And I just shoved it in my pocket. And it started eating away at me all
day .... The last thing that I expected to find was that. ... It brought back so
many bad memories. I just closed down. I wouldn't talk. I was laying in here
[in the room], in the dark. I wouldn't talk to anybody."
Another participant, Diane also began her story with events that happened before she
was admitted into the hospital:
"Okay, like last year, I met this guy [in June]. I got pregnant. I went to take
a test. To get more pills. And they told me I was positive. And my youngest
child at the time was 5. And the other one was 6. By my taking Lithium and
all those kind of medications, everybody thought that my baby would be born
with brain damage and no spine and all that. I went through all that. And so
I entered the hospital [in July] ... So when I got here ... I was so upset I fell to
my knees."
It is a different sort of connecting, stepping into another person's world. The

usual stance one takes as either a researcher or a clinician is one of distance. For the
clinician, the paradigm most often used is a framework of pathology. Within this
paradigm, one seeks to diagnose and treat a patient. Within this paradigm, the
clinician applies psychological theories to help understand the patient. The danger
with a paradigm of pathology, however, is that in pathologizing the person, one
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discounts and diminishes the significance of what is said. One, therefore, can hear
clinicians say in a pejorative tone, "Oh, she's just a Borderline."
For the researcher, the usual stance is one of objectivity. The researcher
assumes and values the distance between the researcher and the subject. Within this
paradigm, the researcher's responsibility is to collect data from the subject that is
uncontaminated by the researcher's experiences and understandings. The danger with
this stance of objectivity, however, is that one centers one's concerns around the truth
and validity of what is said. One then asks, "How do I know that this really
happened?"
By

con~t,

when the researcher is open to what emerges and is open to

understanding the other's experiences, that distance diminishes. It does not close
completely, however. This distance diminishes because the focus of the interviewer's
attention is on trying to understand the other person by listening and trying to piece
together what the participants are saying. The focus is on trying to understand how
another person is experiencing living a life. According to Heidegger (1927/1962;
1949/1995), understanding another person is possible because of being-in-the-world-because of the relational structure between human beings and the entities encountered.
Transcendence is another term that Heidegger uses to denote being-in-the-world.
Transcendence, which means "overstepping," is the originary mode of being that
makes it possible for a human being to be attuned to other human beings.
Transcendence makes it possible to connect with another and to understand another.
Transcendence makes the fusion of horizons between two people possible.
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If there is to be a fusion of horizons and an overcoming of the dist.a.nee

dictated by the dominant paradigm, interviewing another person cannot simply be the
collecting of the data. Interviewing another is a mode of engagement that brings the
researcher to a more fundamental way of being with another. The researcher is
engaged in a conversation that connects the researcher and the participant. While
engaging in this connecting conversation, the interviewer asks the participant to
describe what an experience is like. "Is it like this? Or is it like that?" By way of
the interview, the participants then reveal part of themselves. By way of the
interview the participant's world is unveiled. Yet, this world is never completely
revealed. There is a part of their world that will always remains hidden. It is
import.ant to remember that part of who we are always remains concealed. The
question for the researcher, then is not "How do I know they are telling me the
truth?" The question becomes "How much of who they are have they revealed to me?
And how much remains undisclosed?"
Caputo (1987) cites the face as an example of the play between concealment
and unconcealment, of disclosure and undisclosure, of aletheia (unconcealment) and
~(concealment).

The face is the setting for language. It enables one to conceal

what shall remain hidden. Yet the face also has the capacity to

~

what one

wishes would remain hidden. "The cold look with which the words are calmly
delivered discloses an even greater anger than angry words. The look of hurt says
more than the words which say it does not matter" (Caputo, 1987, p. 273-274).
One's being-in-the-world is given away in the face. Yet, we are not always sure of
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the messages that are given away and received. Often, these signals are uncertain and
confused. The face as a place of opening, as a clearing, is not neat and
unambiguous.
The face is a shadowy place, a flickering region where we cannot always trust
our eyes ... It is ... a hall of mirrors, a play of reflections, a place of
dissemblance and dissimulation, sometimes a place which we manipulate in
order to produce an effect, sometimes a place where the truth gets out of the
bag on us against our will. Sometimes our face betrays us, and sometimes we
give the lie to others by putting on a convincing face. The human face is
anything but simple and unambiguous, anything but just surface. It is streaked
with hidden depths and concealed motives. (Caputo, 1987, p.273)
It is, however, the look of the other that draws one into both mystery and confusion

as the listener attempts to answer the question, ":wlw is speaking here?" It was often
the face that drew me into the story. "Why is she smiling here? "Why does he look
away?" "What does that mean?" It is the unknown that drew me into the story in
order to answer the questions, "Who are you?" and "How have you come to see
things this way?"
It was by looking into the face of the other that I could

~

what they were

telling me. I felt a sadness that could not be conveyed merely in the words they
spoke. Yet the sadness was

~.

The sadness was in the drop in the voice and in

the look in the eyes. It was how Marcia looked when I asked her if she remembered
what she thought about while in restraints. And she answered,
"A lot of times I'd think about my mother. She passed away a few years ago.
And I'm just thinking, 'Sorry, Mom.'"
We both pause in silence. And Dan's response to the same question:
"A lot of times I would start thinking about. It was over the Christmas
holidays, so I would start thinking about all the people who were having a
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good time. What I could be doing. What I. I would start thinking about my
ex-girlfriend. I would get mad. I would start thinking about my brother. My
family. Everybody else."
I looked in Barb's eyes when she told me that she cut her throat before the
Emergency Medical Service arrived. I looked at her, trying to encourage her to go
on, thinking, "You did that? Why?" And, she looked away as if it was nothing. Or
was it shame that caused her to look away? The face does not reveal the feeling and
the words cover over the feeling.
"My friends called the EMS. And the EMS showed up. And I was here, split
from here to here. I said, 'Its a sharp knife.' I was just playing around. And
said, 'Shit, this is really sharp!' And I split myself very bad. And, here they
are. Now, what are you going to tell 'em? Here I am, bleeding down the
neck. 'It's okay, really.' They go to all these houses and everybody has split
necks. I tried to convince them that I was fine. Which we had a long
discussion over."
Another participant tells me about jumping in front of a subway train six years
ago. I looked at him. I looked for the face to reveal something. There was no
expression on his face and no change in the tone of voice. These spoken words bring
a slight pause to the interview; the words surprise me. But, the spoken words do not
surprise me as much as the participant's lack of affect or feeling. This participant
recounted the story as if it was nothing.
"I took a bunch of medicine and drank about a six-pack of beer and then stood
in front of, on the El. This was about 6, 7 years ago. And it didn't. The
train goes on top of me. And I'm saying, 'Oh it didn't work again.' It went
over the top and he [the train] scrapes the shoulder. And, then, what
happened was that I'm laying there and I'm telling myself it didn't work again.
This was about the seventh or eighth time I tried to kill myself. And then,
what happened was that I put my foot forward and I hit the electrical line and
then I woke up in the hospital ... That's when they gave me Tegretol and
Depakote."
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And Barb told me that she "shoots" Morphine and Versed. She can't
remember what it was like io be "clean." How little I know of her world. And yet, I
am drawn in to her as I try to understand that world.
"So, what happened was that I had a week off by myself, and well, now, what
would you do? You're drinking beer, shooting Valium. Yeah, I'm shooting
Valium, IV'ing Versed and Morphine. I have a whole week of wondering
what's going to happen to me."
While there were parts of each of these interviews that were easier to comprehend,
these experiences were difficult to understand. It was difficult for me to understand
the detachment and the lack of affect surrounding the spoken words. "What does this
mean?" I thought to myself. I could only speculate an answer to that question
because the participants were not going to reveal that part of who they are.
There were other instances, however, when I could sense that I had connected
with who this person was. These were the times I was getting a glimpse of who they
really~-

According to Caputo (1987), whatever shows itself to another comes from

the deepest depths. Yet it is not something that we can touch or hold. It comes out
and then hides away. Who these individuals were would come out and then hide
away. It was something I could feel as we moved through the interview. The early
tentativeness would give way to more openness and then the tentativeness would
return. It is this hiddenness, this mystery that Caputo says inspires a respect for the
other. It is the mystery that inspires awe, fear and admiration. It was the mystery
and the unknown that pulled me into their worlds.
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Bein& Mentally Ill

For these participants, living was difficult. Each participant, in a unique way,
told of his or her individual struggling. This struggling became apparent, concretely,
as the participants struggled with the staff or struggled to get free from restraints.
Their personal struggling, however, became more apparent as their worlds were
opened up to me. Barb was one who struggled in a very concrete way with the staff
about the rules on the unit:
"They were coming into my room, and they wanted me to go out to the day
room. And, I didn't want to. Well, they thought I should go to the day
room ... Well, there was a whole gob of people, standing out there. And, I
stepped into the hallway, and I said, 'I'm not going.' And they said, 'No, you
have to go.' And so, I planted my feet and about 20 big guys, maybe a
hundred, jumped on me. I'm not a TV person. You know? They think it
would be better if we get out and socializ.e, well, I'd be better if I sleep. They
wanted me to go .dQ something, make beads or something, and I didn't want
to.,,
She also struggled while in restraints:
"Well. I struggled more. And she [the nurse] said, 'Why are you struggling?
You can't get free, you're not going to go anyplace. Why are you
struggling?' ... [And they said,] 'What are you doing?' 'Well, what does it look
like I'm doing. I'm taking a shower. Give me a break.' So they did. They
tightened the restraints down. "
Diane, on the other hand, struggled with the difficult choices in her life. She had to
decide whether to keep her baby despite the threat of birth defects. She struggled
with choosing to go off her medication while she was pregnant. And she struggled
with the symptoms of her illness that resulted from that choice--from going off her
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medication. Finally, she struggled with trying to take care of her sick baby. One can
hear her struggling in her voice:
"I couldn't stand up and walk. I guess mainly because my doctor took me off
my medication, for myself. I was just so weak. Carrying this baby. I gotta
carry him 9 months. I made this decision. I chose. I made the decision to go
on and have this baby. It just took so much strength ... And my youngest child
at the time was 5. And the other one was 6. By my taking Lithium and all
those kind of medications, everybody thought that my baby would be born
with brain damage and no spine and all that. I went through all that. And so
I entered the hospital ... The only reason I came cause I had to stop taking my
medication in order to carry this child. Which was my choice, whether I
wanted to keep the child or not. But I chose. I wanted to keep it. And I had
to stop taking my medication in order for this child to grow in me, to develop
in me or whatever... They could save what is left of the child. You know, if
the child had brain damage or whatever. So when I found out I was pregnant,
I called my [doctor]. She told me just come in and she completely took me
off all the medication I was on. For my health. It was a very, very difficult
pregnancy ... The baby's father didn't want to have nothing to do with me.
Didn't want to have nothing to do with me. He said he didn't want no
relationship, no commitment. 'Cause he had been in a 5 year divorce,
marriage and was pending divorce. The divorce was in process. You know.
It was like I was caught in the middle of all that."
Diane then tells of a second episode of being restrained. She began the story when
she was at home taking care of her sick baby. She was worried about her baby, but
could not quite figure out what was wrong with the baby nor what to do about it.
Finally, her mother intervened and somewhere in the middle of the scenario she was
hospitalized.
"Yes. And see won't nobody listen to me. You know. Every time I say
something, 'Oh, she crazy.' 'She don't know what she talking about.' But, this
is a life here. You know, I'm trying to save my baby's life. Cause its wrong.
They telling me, not my mother, they telling me he got an ear infection. If a
fever persists more than three to four days, take him to the doctor. And it was
almost eight days. You know. So I just came here and I just left everything in
the world in my mama and daddy's hands. When my mom couldn't break his
fever after Friday, after Saturday, she brought him into the hospital."
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Sometimes the participant's struggling was around distinguishing what was real
from what was not real. This prompted the participants to ask themselves "Could I
really trust the staff? How do I know the staff won't hurt me?" "Was I really going
to be safe?" "What is happening to me?" Although the participants' pain and
suffering were apparent in the interviews, struggling with their illness seemed to be
underneath this pain and suffering. Dan best describes this struggling. His actual
restraining episode was precipitated by his fears that the other patients on the unit had
AIDS. In his mind, if he went into restraints the staff would put him in another room
on another floor. That did not happen. He was restrained on the same floor. His
thoughts about staff and his distress that he never quite knew what anybody was up to
were intertwined with his description of being restrained.
"It all started because I was afraid I was going to get AIDS at [a hospital].
Because there were no sanitary conditions ... ! had roommates that were picked
up off the streets ... ! was telling myself that I almost had AIDS ... I finally went
up to the desk. I said, 'I want to be located. Put me down somewhere. I
want to go downstairs ... Put me down there so I could be at less risk.'
Anyway, they agreed. And after doing that, they said, 'Okay, we'll put you
down. We'll put you down and then all of a sudden, they're like, 'no' ... and
I'm suffering in the hospital with my mental illness because they don't know
what they are doing. And I can't get in touch with my doctor. Because
they're too busy playing their games ... It was at staff [his anger]. And it was
at my. It was at. Well, it was kind of at myself. That I had let myself get into
an outburst. But, I said to myself, 'If I don't do it, how long will this go on?
If I don't go into outbursts now.' I try to cooperate. I've been in this
hospital, say, it must have been two weeks. Or a week and a half. If I don't
do it now, you know, when will they stop? I mean, it's like, you know. It's
like Hitler kept. I mean, I remember from seeing the movie 'The Godfather.'
They said they should have stopped Hitler at Munich. Or something. It's like
if you think about Desert Storm. Or World War II, any war. It you think
about something where it should have been stopped. You know, at a certain
point, but some reason, some force. Another force, kept on going. That's
what I thought. I thought that if I don't let these people know that I'm serious
and I'm not meant to be played around with, next thing I know I'm going to
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be in there two months. They're going to keep on tormenting me. So, it's
like, I have to do something. And I think that worked. Though it didn't work
in my favor, I got injured and stuff. I think it made them realize that I was
not to be toyed with. And then there was another. Oh, another reason, another
reason why I almost got ... And I thought they were going to try to get me
again. Cause they were making. They were making the same moves. Fast
moves. And everybody was jumping around. So, okay, here goes my blood
pressure. I'm getting all ready. Everything's going. Everything's racing
inside, but on the outside I'm calm. I'm cool and kind of like walking around
smiling, kind of like I am now. Just looking happy. Like I'm just all doped up
on whatever, on Valiums, whatever happy pills. All of a sudden in my mind,
I'm thinking, 'What the hell are they doing? What the hell are they doing?' ... "
It is difficult to imagine what living life is like when one is psychotic and unable to

organize or make sense out of what is happening. Because Dan did not know what to
expect and he was never quite sure if he could trust the staff, he was quite frightened
while in restraints:
"I was scared. I was scared out of my mind. I was scared that I might get
AIDS. I was scared that somebody might come in ... and stick me with a pill
that might kill me ... Just out of watching movies. And television. What
happens in hospitals. Afraid that somebody might just come in there and,
'Hey, this guy is really a nuisance. He's talking about suing the hospital.
Why don't we just go in there and give him a dose of this thing ... So, I had a
definite fear of death ... The AIDS factor, too. Could have been prevalent.
And didn't know who they would have sent in there or what they would have
done to me. They might have sent a guy in there to bite me who's got
AIDS .... I mean, I knew at the time that they [his thoughts] weren't true. But,
everything or anything was racing through my mind."
In a broader context, then, these participants were struggling to live their lives

as individuals with mental illnesses. For them, it was a struggle to simply deal with
the things they needed to deal with in life. Several participants described how the
illness had affected their lives. Diane, for example, talks about what it was like to be
home, pregnant and off all her medication:

76
"I cried so hard. I ain't cried again since then. If I watch a show or
something and they talking about children and something happened to the
children, you know, I might well up with tears in my eyes. But the way I was
crying. It was like I had lost somebody through death. You know? ... Then
when I was finish in the hospital and I go home and I be crying like my
grandma. I'd be feeling this way because I don't have no medication in my
body for myself. You know, helpless, so I couldn't do nothing. Nothing ... Talk
about eating. I couldn't eat. I had to force myself to eat. Force it."
And Doreen described what it was like for her as she looked back at what happened,
now knowing she had not been thinking clearly:
"I just couldn't sleep, so I kept cleaning whatever and my mind just. I
imagined things that weren't real. Like it was the end of the world. And stuff
like that. .. I thought I was a fountain. So, I'd take some water, and drink it,
and I'd sit on the table and spin around and squirt water over. But, as far as
being out of control, I don't really think that I was ... I was doing dumb things.
I was really not in my right mind ... "
When Barb reached those moments when nothing mattered to her, she
struggled with wanting to die:
"I don't really, really have a lot to say, because when I get in these moods,
people get scared of them. Because I'm just flat out not afraid to die. And, I
could care less ... No, I didn't want to be protected. I wanted to kill myself.
Very sad, isn't it?· You guys are stuck with me. I can't even kill myself."
Orlando struggled with wanting to kill himself. It seemed, however, that he
also struggled with wanting to live. He had a history of a seizure disorder and
recently had been switched to a new anti-convulsant medication. One side-effect of
the medication was a severe, suicidal depression. He was hospitalized following a
suicide attempt and at the time of the hospitalization, his primary goal was to be
switched back to his previous anti-convulsant medication.
"What was happening is the fact that I tried to kill myself over the fact this
medicine I was taking ... Now the medicine worked perfectly. I didn't have any
seizures. But, it gave me depression. So, I tried to kilJ myself. Twice, since
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November ... ! didn't have any seizures, but, I had depression. And, I wanted
to get rid of it. And what I wanted to do was that I wanted to stop taking the
[medication]. I wanted them to give me the Depakote. And they wouldn't do
it. They said what they'll do is, 'We'll reduce it slowly, and give you the
Depakote'. And I got mad."
Because he was still suicidal, he needed to be out of his room in order for staff to
watch him. His anger over his medication, his persistent depression and his being
watched precipitated a struggle with the staff. He wanted his medication changed.
The staff wanted him in their sight. As we will see later, he won the struggle.
"They had me in the bed where they could watch me 'cause I was suicidal.
And plus, they had me with what do you call it, with fluids ... So, what I did
was just. I said, 'We're going to do it this way.' And so, what I did. I said,
I was going to walk in the bedroom and lay in my bed. And you can check me
out here. I don't want all these people walking by and looking at me. And they
said, 'You can't do it that way.'"
Why Me?

According to Heidegger, we are thrown beings. We are situated in a
particular time and place and are born into particular circumstances. Thus, by virtue
of our existing, our possibilities are limited. These participants were attuned to this
thrownness. They were attuned to the constraints that limit their lives. Therefore,
living into their possibilities, they were reminded of their finitude. They struggled
with their thrownness. For these participants, their sense of their own thrownness was
manifested in the question "Why me?" On one level, the "Why me?" question was
very concrete and literal--"Why was I thrown into restraints?" or "Why was I
watched more closely?" But, on another level, it was an existential question--"Why
am I the way I am?" "Why am I mentally ill?"
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Carl's interview was somewhat unique in that asking "Why me?" was mostly
related to his not remembering what happened when he was restrained. He had two
restraining episodes while in the hospital. The first was particularly disturbing to him
because he could not remember what precipitated being restrained. And
consequently, he believed that he was unjustly put into restraints. Interestingly,
between the time he agreed to be interviewed and the actual interview, he went to
staff to ask them what happened. Therefore, at the time of the interview, he felt
more resolved about the first restraining episode. He still, however, did not
understand the reasons for the second episode. He continued to wonder "Why me?"
This is what he said about the first episode as he described what he was thinking
about while in restraints:
"So, it's like I'm the victim, what did I do? When, in fact, there was good
reason ... I thought about Jesus Christ. What he must have gone through, to be
nailed to the cross. And that, I think, helped. The suffering and the. Well,
at that time, I felt like I wasn't justified to be there. So, I rationalized Jesus
Christ. How he was not justified to be nailed to the cross. I was not justified
to be in restraints, you see. But, the fact of the matter, very well could, and
probably is different with the first time. Now, the second time is another
matter."
After the second episode of being restrained, he saw other patients on the unit who he
thought were more out of control than he felt he was. Thus, he was never able to
reconcile his being restrained this second time:
"The second one that happened right outside my door here, was within a day,
or less of the first one. And I said something to one of the nurses, a male
nurse, big guy, about my size. And I went like that to talk to him, to get my
point across like that. That was it. Restrained. And then, after the fact, I
find out. I see an episode where a girl is smashing a chair in a room, to
splinters. Just recently. No restraints. Doesn't seem very fair to me: And
the second one, I think was definitely uncalled for. They could have told me,
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'Stay in my room 15 minutes.' There was no, there was no option
there ... .l've since made, what's the word, accepted the situation. So, I have
no animosity towards him. He did what he thought was best ....I saw this
trapesty [travesty], in the second time, afterwards, as far as the guidelines, and
I realize that there's human error there. You know, there's two different
people and they're going to think. They're going to have a different viewpoint
of the situation, so that's why I came to the point of like, that's okay."
Dan was another participant who compared himself to others around him,
wondering, not only why

~

was in restraints, but why he was hospitalized on a

psychiatric unit. His response to the "Why me?" question was to get angry--at both
himself and the staff.
"Just anger and confusion. And like, 'Why am I here?' I mean like I've seen
people along the whole hospital that were more messed up than I was. And I
said to myself, 'Why am I in restraints?' It was at staff [anger] ... Well, it was
kind of at myself.... Here I am thinking, 'I'm paying' ... I go, 'You fucking
animals. You're treating me like. What is this, a Nazi Camp?' And that's
what I was saying. It was like a Nazi Camp ... After I stopped struggling, I lay
down and started thinking ... lt was over the Christmas holidays, so I would
start thinking about all the people who were having a good time. What I could
be doing ... ! would start thinking about my ex-girlfriend. I would get mad. I
would start thinking about my brother. My family. Everybody else. I felt
that they had abandoned me. I would get mad. And I would continue to
struggle."
Diane wondered why she was put in restraints. From her perspective, here she was,
pregnant and still she was restrained:

"I was 1ike, 'Why me?.... I' m pregnant. and I' mm
. restramts
. ....
' I' m commg
.
here to help my .self, volunteering. You know, volunteering without being
paid ... And they still want to treat me like the rest of the patients? I said, 'Ununh.' I said, 'I've been coming here over six years. I don't know how many
years, but, I've been coming here a long period of time.'"
With some participants, the "Why me?" question was less concrete and direct.
Many participants talked about their anger at staff. Yet, their anger seemed to be a
way to cope with how things are for them. The anger seemed to cover over the
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"Why me?" question. For these participants, the question remained implicit and
hidden.

James was one whose "Why me?" question was more tacit. He was angry

at being restrained and felt he was undeservedly restrained. His response to being
restrained was to wish bad things for the staff. Underlying these statements,
however, was the wish that things could be different for him. His anger covered over
his sense of powerlessness:
"I was saying things like, 'You could pay for this because I don't feel like I
was out [of control].' ... I felt like they're going. Somehow they're going to
pay for it. [By] things happening to them. I can predict things happening to
people. I was wishing a lot of bad things happening to people. Getting into
car accidents. Having migraine headaches. Getting into arguments with their
family members. Any kind of negative things that you could think of... I was
just angry, so I said a lot of things that I didn't mean. When you get angry,
you say things you don't mean. I was saying things like, 'I hope you get hit
by a semi on your way home from work.' And things like that. I just kinda
lost control, but I was in a lot more control than they realized."
Bein& Restrained
Relations of Power
Foucault (1965; 1977; 1980a; 1980b; 1980c; 1983; Deleuze, 1986) defines
power as actions that are exerted upon actions, with the intention of guiding another's
conduct and ordering the outcome. For Foucault, power is diffuse. Power is not
something concrete that is possessed by particular individuals or groups of people.
Power moves from person to person and is available to everyone. Power, therefore
exists only within the activity of people and is exercised within a network of
relationships.
There are two characteristics of power (Foucault, 1983) that are particularly
relevant to these interviews and to the restraining of patients. The first is that power
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can only be exerted over one who has a field of possible action. This means that
there must be freedom in order for there to be power. In other words, there must be
the possibility of recalcitrance and a struggle. There must be the possibility of
resistance. This means then, that relations of power are reversible. If one removes
the possibility of action, there no longer is a power relationship. It is now a
relationship of constraint. Foucault does acknowledge that there are certain
asymmetrical relations of domination (Hindess, 1996). Yet even in these
relationships, power is never completely one-sided. There is always the possibility of
resistance and the reversal of that power.
In these interviews, we can see power struggling between the participant and

the staff and the movement of power back and forth between the participant and the
staff. Most often, the actual restraining episode began with an altercation between the
participant and the staff. These episodes began with the participant and the staff
struggling with each other about the rules of the unit. Therefore, a typical scenario
began with the patient violating one of the rules of the unit. The staff would respond
to the patient by reiterating the rules, or by setting a limit. At this point, the
participant would refuse to follow either the rule or the limit, resulting in a stand-off
between the participant and the staff. Ultimately, however, power would be exerted
by a staff "show of force." And then the participant would be restrained. Thomas is
fairly typical in his description of this power struggle:
"She said something, then I said something back. Then I said a curse word
like 'damn you' or something like that. She asked me to go to my room. I
said I wasn't going right then. She said, 'I want you to go to ... your room ... '
I started going to my room. Before I went to my room, about 6 nurses-4
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nurses and 2 orderlies came. And I said, 'Um, either one of you touch me,
I'll break your mother fuckin' arm.' So they started walking behind me. I
went to my room. I slammed the door. Ten minutes later, they had some
security come up from downstairs. "
For this participant, the actual restraining episode occurred the next day. Thomas
was in the day room, watching television and started talking with the other patients
about the interaction that had occurred the day before. This violates one of the
unwritten rules of the unit. "Do not discuss your issues with other patients in the day
room," especially if it involves a disagreement with staff. And so, he was told not to
discuss the events with the other patients. What follows is his response to staff
setting a limit and the stand-off between the participant and the staff:
"So I said, 'No, I will not. I can discuss it with who I want to.' She said, 'If
you want to discuss it, discuss it with another staff.' I said, 'I don't want to
discuss it with another staff.' She said,' Well, then, I'm going to ask you to
go to your room and take 15 minutes.' ... And then I sat there .for a few
minutes and she said, 'If you will not get up. We'll get some help.'"
Marcia also talked about her struggling with a staff member who was setting a limit:
"I was just feeling anxious and bored. I was just playing cards with
somebody, and I had been here for so long. I was just so bored ... So, I was
just like tapping on the table or something, talking with this other girl and just
tapping on the table, and this one nurse came over to see me and she said,
'Marcia, quit tapping on the table.' And I got all upset and saying, 'I can tap
on the table if I want to tap on the table.' And so, she started calling people
over already, you know. And I knew what that was. I thought, 'Gimme a
break. I can't do so many things in this hospital. I can't do anything. I can't
even go outside for a second. If I want to tap the table, I'll tap the table.' I
mean, the whole thing was kind of ludicrous ... But, at the time, it was just too
much. Just them trying to tell me that I can't go like that [she taps]. It was
too much. It made me feel angry, like that they have a lot of nerve coming
and telling me something so banal as that. And, pretty much, upset about it."
And Diane also struggled with staff around the limits they set with her:
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"I'm coming here to help my self, volunteering. You know, volunteering,
without being paid ... ! just wanted them to leave me alone. Yeah, you know.
You're not telling me to go to my room. I come here and want to smoke a
cigarette... and tell me to go back to my room. You know, I'm not here to
hurt nobody ... They don't like you to curse. They say,' go to your
room.' ... She's going to tell me to go in there until 8:30. Then I've been
stretched to 9:30. What am I going to do in here until 9:30?"
In the preceding examples, the struggling and resistance wer:e around the rules

on the unit. At other times, the participants resisted being watched by staff. Both the
rules of the unit and the surveillance of the patient are practices, instituted by the
staff, in order to maintain safety on the unit. For Foucault, however, these practices
are also disciplinary techniques that are exerted by one in order to control the conduct
of others (Foucault, 1965; 1977; 1980a). In medicine, surveillance takes the form of
the "gaze," whereby a person becomes a subject to be watched, diagnosed and
categorized. In the prison, the method of surveillance was the panopticon, an
efficient system that consisted of a centralized tower that enabled the maximum
number of prisoners to be within view of a minimum number of guards. Medical
institutions have also adopted this panoptic notion, positioning the nursing station
centrally, so that a maximum number of beds are within view of the nursing staff.
On psychiatric units, staff often want the patients to be out of their rooms,

within sight of staff. If a particular patient is suicidal, that patient is kept in constant
view of staff. The participants often struggled around being out of their rooms in
view of staff. The participants resisted being visible to and being watched by staff.
Rather than feeling taken care of and safe, the participants felt constrained. Orlando
and Barb both described their feelings about being watched:
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"And I got mad. They had me in the bed where they could watch me 'cause I
was suicidal. And plus, they had me with, what do you call it? With fluids.
They had me on the IV's because I tried to OD. And they slowly had to get
that out of my kidneys. So, that's the way it was. I was on 24 hour watch
and plus, I had an N on. So, what I did was just. I said, 'We're going to do
it this way.' And so, what I did. I said I was going to walk in the bedroom
and lay on my bed. And you can check me out here. I don't want all these
people walking by and looking at me. And they said, 'You can't do it that
way. We gotta be able to watch you. You can't go in there.' So, I went in
there. I wouldn't stay in the hallway ... ! knew they were going to do
something. I knew that they weren't going to let me in there. They were
going to do something. But, I didn't know that they were going. to put me in
and strap me down. I didn't realize how far they were going to go with it. .. "
"They were coming into my room, and they wanted me to go out to the day
room. And, I didn't want to. Well, they thought I should go to the day
room ... Well, there was a whole gob of people, standing out there. And, I
stepped into the hallway, and I said, 'I'm not going.' And they said, 'No, you
have to go.'"
This theme of being watched came up in other contexts. For instance, some
participants felt that they were being watched more closely than other patients. These
participants felt singled out by the staff and consequently, they felt that their activity
was more closely scrutinized. Marcia felt that staff watched her more closely
because, in the past, she had lost control of herself on the unit:
"I remember one [instance] in particular where I had felt that they were going
after me a little bit more than other people. I had been here for over three and
a half months and so things that I would do, they would jump on the gun.
And other people, it wouldn't be as big deal. That's what I felt. ... ! already
had instances in the past where I had started, like hittin' the walls and stuff,
right? So, there were other times where I felt it was more reasonable for them
to come out after me like that. 'Cause I was actually doing something. But,
here, I was just tapping the table and I thought that they just kind of saw me
doing that, and said, 'Oh, well, she's going to start hitting the walls and all
this, so we've got to stop her now.'"
It was not clear why Diane thought she was being watched more closely:
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"I knew that whatever little move I make, they going to watch me and gonna
end up making me go into restraints."
Finally, some patients had feelings about being watched while in restraints.
Marcia's comments, in particular, support Foucault's assertion that the person is made
subject by this surveillance:
"Usually they'll check on you through the window slot. It's always pretty
creepy, because they have this little... You can't even talk to them through that
and then they'll go shttt [she demonstrates closing the little window]. There's
a little thing on the wire, and they'll lift it up and go like that, and you'll see
their face and everything. And they'll be just like staring in on you. And
then they'll just close it down again, right away ... I hate that. It just. That
just kind of furthers the feeling of being just kind of like a specimen at that
point, you know?"
Most of the participants were restrained in specially designated rooms that were
locked and had small windows on the door. The staff are required by law to check
on the restrained patients every fifteen minutes. Diane described her experience
seeing staff check on her through the window:
"They would peek through the window. I guess if I'm woke, then they go
back out. They wouldn't even come in. That would make me feel so bad.
They locked the door after they leave out. Left me up in this room, by
myself. And it just. I just don't like it. .. When I would hear them unlocking
it, I would be like, 'I guess I'm fixin' to get out of here.'"
Both Marcia and Laurie had feelings, not only about being watched, but also
about not being talked to. They were in the restraint room, separated by locked
doors, being watched and yet were unable to communicate with staff. Two other
techniques of power that Foucault (1965/1977) discusses are being separated from
others and not being talked to. In a sense, not being talked to and being physically
separated are both separations. When staff stop talking to the patient, they sever
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contact with the other person. When one stops talking to another, it is as if the other
person was not there. Marcia described how staff, at some point during the takedown, stopped talking to her:
"And so, they just dragged me down, and everybody was like yelling at
everybody to leave the room, leave the room, sort of like high pitched. And
everybody screaming, and everybody. They like had ceased to talk to me,
cause I guess that they felt that I couldn't be reached. And that wasn't true."
Laurie also reacted negatively to not being talked to while she was in restraints:
"Well, I didn't like it when I heard them at the outside, the very outside door.
And they didn't come in and open that door. They were watching me. Well,
what were they watching for? I couldn't move, get out of it."
Thomas had a cardiac condition. While in restraints, he was alone and
separated from the staff. He worried that he might get sick and no one would know.
He worried that he might die. In order to regain contact with the staff, Thomas
moved his bed around the room, making noises and hoping the staff would come in
and check on him:
"And there's not a bell for you to ring. I had to kick the bed to make noise for
them to come in to let me use the bathroom the first time ... By them can't hear
me. No one coming right in. There's 2 doors. You have to bang, bang.
What if I had congestive heart failure? Or if I had problems breathing? Or if I
would have had a heart attack? They didn't check on me like every five
minutes. They only came there when they thought I was doing something, or
I banged real hard with my feets, kicked against the bed and it made a big
bang noise. I would slam back and I kicked real, real hard. Then they came
in to see was I trying to break loose. That was the only chance. Thoughts that
went through my head. What if I have a heart attack. And it take them so long
to come from. What are they doing? Way up here or just sitting in the day
room? Or just laughing? What if I would have had a heart attack? And no one
came in?"
Dan also made noises so that the staff would come in:
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"I couldn't be heard. So, I finally. I started moving. I moved my bed to the
window. And what I would do is that I would pound. I would pound, and
that would get their attention. Or I would move to the door. And after I got
done bloodying my knuckles a little bit. What I would do is that I would get
the restraining strap and banging that on the door. And that would carve a
little, carve a little wood off there ... Now, that got their attention right away.
Cause that was loud and I enjoyed that thoroughly."
The staff did come in to check on Dan, but it was usually to give him medication to
help him calm down. Whereas he was trying to make contact with the staff, they
probably thought he was still out of control:
"And they come in there and shut me up and they give me a pill or something
or stick me with a needle. Something like that. And, you know, it would do
me up for a while. I'd go to sleep for a half hour. My body was, and still is
so resistant to medicine. It's like it didn't matter, because all of a sudden, I
was up again singing .... At least the other time, I had some kind of AIDS
patient next to me. And some nurse left the door open ... This time, I had the
fucking door closed. Nobody out there, and I was on the other end of the
unit. Nobody could hear me. Over at the other... somebody could hear me.
If I started freaking out, they'll come in there and they'll give me another.
They'll dope me up. At least put me to sleep ... I was completely alone. And
when the lights went out, that's what really scared me. I was in a room about
this size... At first I asked, can they keep the light on. And they said, 'Yeah'.
And then, after my outburst, they turned it off. Lower and then they turned it
completely off. So, there I am, sitting for 12 hours, probably which 8, 9 of
them were completely in the dark ... I was scared. I was scared out of my
mind."
The second characteristic of power that Foucault discusses is the rooting of
these power relations within social networks (Foucault, 1983). These systems of
social networks not only differentiate between members of the community, but these
systems authorize certain individuals to act upon the actions of other. On the
psychiatric unit, patients and staff are differentiated into a system of hierarchy.
Patients are constantly reminded of this hierarchy by the reality that some people

carry keys while others do not. Marcia put this relationship most cogently:
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"A lot of time when you're in doctor or nurse and patient relationships, you
get little hints of that all the time ... But, when it gets down to this [being
restrained], there's like no question. You have no power whatsoever."
Within these social networks, there must also be a pur.pose to the action upon
others. On psychiatric units, the primary purpose for having rules, setting limits,
watching the patients and using restraints is safety. The staff are held responsible for
the safety of the patients. These practices, therefore, come from staff concern (and
anxiety) that patients will lose control and hurt themselves and/or others. The
consequence of these actions, however, is to control the actions of the patient. Often
this control (setting limits, imposing rules) is exerted early before things escalate and
get out of control. This may account for why none of the participants felt they were
dangerous or out of control. This perception of not being out of control contributed
to some participants feeling singled out by staff, especially if they saw others whom
they thought were more out of control. Thomas was one participant who felt that he
was not out of control to a degree that he thought would require restraining:
"I have seen other people on the floor while I'm up here, have been
outrageous more than me and they just take them to their room for out time.
They never been restrained. To me, restraints should be when its out of hand.
Really out of hand, when you can't do any more. I didn't hurt no one. Sure, I
know they supposed to take cautious. They never know what a person going
to do. But, they could have gave me a shot. They're already holding me
down. They could have just gave me a shot and made me relax. Other than
chaining you up like an animal. I'm against restraining, up to the point to it's
really necessary to be used. I'm not saying that I was right, totally. Cause
some of it was my fault, but still."
James was another participant who felt he was not out of control. He, however, had
some understanding of how the staff might interpret his actions. In his situation,
James was resisting the rules on the unit. He knew that he could scare staff with his
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voice and his verbal threats, so out of a sense of powerlessness, he started yelling:
"I was tired of being controlled by the system here in the institution. So, I got
angry and I started yelling ... And saying very threatening things to them, [like]
I was going to kill them and all this kind of stuff. And, I had power over
them. Which I do anyway. I already know that ... See, the thing of it is, ~
were the ones that were getting upset with me and they thought that I was
going to harm them ... I could harm them through my verbal expression, and
they were getting very scared about the whole thing ... ! was just verbally
threatening them. I wasn't going to do anything to them ... I was in full control
of myself, except they were the ones that got me angry. See, I got them angry
because of the threatening things I was saying, and I was yelling. I was
yelling at the top of my lungs. And, I have a lot of power in my voice. And,
it is very scary. So, it scared them to the point where they thought that I
needed to be in restraints.
Within these networks of social relations, there must also be the means to
bring the power. relations into being. These processes for bringing the power relations
into play may be more or less elaborate as they are adjusted to different situations. On
a psychiatric unit, the final means of controlling the person is through the show of
force. Once the decision is made to put someone in restraints, staff are mobilized to
"take down" and restrain the patient. All of the participants described this show of
force:
"And they called Bill and them from the [other] floor ... and they grabbed me,
turned me around, put me to the ground, to the floor."
"And a swarm of them came in. And they had to drag me, fighting, to the
restraint room. They finally, cause I'm pretty strong, got me down. They
finally turned me around and dragged me. "
"About ten minutes later, three of XX's security officers, carrying guns and
rubber gloves and walkie talkies, and the staff up here, grabbed me by my
arm."
"Well, there was a whole gob of people, standing out there. And, I stepped
into the hallway, and I said, 'I'm not going.' And they said, 'No, you have to
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go.' And so, I planted my feet, and about 20 big guys, maybe a hundred,
jumped on me."
"And, all of a sudden, about five hundred people came up and grabbed me,
carried me and put me in the quiet room. Put the 'straints on me. It was
probably 10 people. "
"But, just a whole flock of people came in. Maybe 8 or 10 or 12 of them
came in and just threw me in restraints. And, what could I do? ... They just
came out of nowhere. There was nobody on the floor and all of a sudden,
there was 10 people in my room."
At some point, either right before or right after the patient was contained by the staff,
the participants struggled, trying to get free. Marcia best described the entire
sequence of events--the show of force and the physical struggle:
"And I knew what that was. That meant that they were going to try to
physically hold me down or something. So, I kinda freaked out and I just
kinda started running around the room, and they were all coming in. They
were all going out there with their hands all like this. So, I was throwing stuff
on the ground and one of them finally got behind me and reached and grabbed
my arm. And then once one of them grabs your arms, like they all come in.
And so, there were 5 or 6 of them and they were trying to get me down and I
was really pumped up, so I was pretty strong ... Just because I was so excited.
And so, they just dragged me down, and everybody was like yelling at
everybody to leave the room, leave the room, sort of like high pitched. And
everybody screaming ... ! felt real trapped and I fought off as best I could, but
there was just too many of them and I couldn't do it...I would have struggled
no matter what. 'Cause, in the past, I had always struggled. Just because its
a real tense situation all the way around. They're trying to get you under
these leather straps, and you're trying to do everything you can not to. And,
so, just something clicks in you. Its like animal instinct, or something.
You're fighting and. Yeah, but you do get a burst of energy. At least, I
always did. I always got a big burst of energy. And that's what made it really
difficult for everybody, every time ... I would become more anxious when I
knew, as soon as I realiz.ed that they were trying to. What they were thinking.
Or what I thought they were thinking about maybe I might have to go in there.
And the physical burst came as soon as I could see them coming out for
me ... The burst, in and of itself, was good. But, you knew where you were
ending up, so it wasn't that great. .. I was just thinking at that point that I don't
want to go in there. 'Cause I knew when they were leading me toward that
room over there, that that's something that I didn't want to do."
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Diane also described a burst of power that came over her right before she went into
restraints:
"When I fell, I put my two arms on the floor and my two legs. I was on my
knees and I was on my hands. And I had so much power. Like I had power
like a lion. Or a tiger. I don't know where it come from, but it was like my
blood just... I just rose up. Rose up like that. Like Jesus or God didn't want
me to fall. Just to give up like that. .. I rose up on my knees. And the palm of
my hands. It reminded me of being a tiger. I thought I was a lion ... lt was
like the Holy Spirit had come within myself. And helped me along the
way ... and that's when the people came to help me."
At the point of being restrained, some participants continued their struggling.
Others stopped resisting. Dan was the participant who struggled the longest. He
described "movies" that were going through his head. While in restraints, he heard
voices that kept telling him to keep up the struggle. The voices were telling him that
he could get out of restraints:
" ... I sort of injured myself because I tried to get free. Well, what I would do
was that I would pull at each, pull at each restraint with my arms ... Kind of
kick back and forth with my legs. I did a pretty good job. I managed to
move the bed and managed to get halfway free out of each restraint. .. ! was in
restraints for 14 hours. Probably struggling for 8-10 of them .... I would pull
the arm back and forth, back and forth. I would kick back and forth. And, it
did no good ... Well, I kept on hearing voices, to tell me to get out, get out.
Get out of these restraints. There were movies that went through my mind.
Well, 'Rocky' movies, particularly 'Rocky 1,2,3,4,5'. Told me to get out of
it. Movies like 'Scarface'. Violent movies. All violent movies. 'Carlito's
Way'. Things they would say, like in the 'Rocky' movie ... They were friendly
to me ... they were like out of a movie or was out of the past or it was just me,
saying, 'You asshole.' They were telling me, 'You can get the hell out of
these restraints'. Yet they were screaming at me in a loud way. They were
telling me in a nurturing way. Like, 'You shouldn't be in them. Come on.
You're better that this. Get out of them.' ... It's almost like the holocaust ... lt's
almost like the power of execution. That you have that power over someone.
To be able to just push a button and kill them ... press a button. And security
comes and ties somebody down .... They don't understand what it does to their
mind. What it does to their body .... They have no respect for life... If 1 didn't
do the behavior that I did ... I had to show them that someone, that, who's
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boss. I'm the boss of my own self. To have that much power over somebody
to put 'em in restraints ... It's like using the electric chair. Just push a button,
and you got somebody tied down. It's inhumane."
On the other hand, there were other participants who surrendered and gave up

the struggle once they were in restraints. Some of these participants knew that if they
stopped struggling they would come out of restraints more quickly. Doreen was one
participant who struggled and yelled for a while and then stopped. She also received
medication which probably helped her calm down.
"And I'd fight and everything, and then they'd shoot me with a needle ... And
then, I just yelled and yelled until I couldn't yell. I was hoarse. Then, I
decided that if I went to sleep, I'd get out of there. Or maybe I would wake
up and they would let me out. Well, they told me I guess, if I'd stop yelling,
that they'd let me out, sooner, if I'd shut up. I guess I was yelling a lot."
Carl also struggled initially and then gave up and surrendered:
"I think I gave up when they got me in the room. I knew what was going to
happen. But prior to, I was trying to struggle from. And try to get away.
[Staff decided to take me out of restraints when] they figured I'd been in there
long enough. And that I was calmed down. Surrendered. Calm and to the
point of surrender. That they knew that I was, admitted defeat and was giving
up. And back to my original frame of mind, I guess."
Marcia and James stopped struggling almost immediately once they were in restraints:
"When they used restraints, at least I just stop struggling immediately, because
it's no use. I mean, I'll stretch around a little bit, depending on how much
space I have. But, you just feel like an animal."
"In the beginning I resisted, and then they did some things that were very
uncomfortable to me ... And then it got to the point where I just stopped
resisting ... ! didn't want to resist anymore because it wasn't wQrth it. I was in
a lot more control of myself than they realized ... As soon as I lay down on the
bed, I stopped resisting and they thought that I was going to keep resisting.
So, they kept putting more pressure on different parts of my body so they
could get the restraints on me faster."
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Finally, within these social networks the techniques of power have become
institutionalized. On psychiatric units, the legal structure supports these relations of
power. Thus staff are permitted by law to restrain patients for protection of self or
others. But, more subtly, the structure of an inpatient psychiatric unit has its own
culture with its own rules that govern the way things are. There is a web of staff
practices that, in essence, constrain the patient into conforming to that structure.
Patients who have been hospitalized understand this culture and for the most part,
conform to that structure. Thomas was one participant who was unfamiliar with the
rules and the culture of a psychiatric unit. He had never been hospitalized on a
psychiatric unit before. Nor had he ever been in restraints. According to him, the
lesson he learned was that it was:
"their way or no way. The staff way ... The only thing it tell me, that if you
don't do it their way, you'll get restrained ... ! never. I didn't know what they
were going to do. I heard a lot of the nurses talk about the back room .. .if you
don't behave, you will go to the back room. I thought maybe the back room
was just a room you go in and sit down for an hour. I didn't know they
would restrain you. I never been in a place like this."
In Foucault's view, relationships of power are reversible. However, only one

participant, Orlando, was able to tum that power around. Recall that he was the
participant who was severely depressed from his anti-convulsant medication and
wanted his medication changed. The physicians, on the other hand, wanted to wait
before starting another medication. Once he was in restraints Orlando refused to
come out until his physicians agreed to change his medication:
"They weren't hurting me in any way. I mean, what they did was they put me
on the bed and then moved me all the way down there. And then picked me
up and brought me into the room. You know, I didn't fight 'em at all. I
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says, 'Hey, let me get up and I'll walk in there.' And they says, 'Its too late
now. You gotta stay down.' So, they carried me in there. You know, it
didn't matter. I didn't give 'em. I didn't fight 'em or nothin'. I would have
stayed in there a long time."
Ironically, being restrained became his bargaining tool. The staff wanted him to
come out of restraints, yet he was willing to remain restrained until he could get his
medication changed. Therefore, for Orlando, being restrained was enabling. It was a
means to get him what he wanted.
"It didn't bother me. I mean, if they're going to keep putting medicine into
me anyway to calm me down, what difference is it going to make. I told them
all's they gotta do is ... I was just thinking about laying there, gettin' over on
'em, because they kept coming in there, trying to get me to get outta
restraints. 'No', I says. 'I want my medicine.' But, I did get it that day.
All of a sudden. There was a doctor that ordered it, but, I got it. And I'm on
it now. And, that one that I didn't want to be on, I won't be on it in a couple
of days ... lt was great. I was tied down here. I could sleep. I don't know,
maybe after 20 or 30 hours, I wouldn't have been able to handle it, but, once I
started yelling and screaming, they would have gave me more medicine and
shut me up ... I would have stayed in there a long time. I think that it was my
wife that sort of give me a talk. She talked to me. And I said, 'Alright, I'll
get out of restraints.'"
Powerlessness
For most of the participants, the experience of being restrained was
disempowering. Most of the participants identified their feelings of powerlessness
and subsequent helplessness as the worst part about being restrained. For many of the
participants, being restrained was also dehumanizing. They felt vulnerable to harm
and humiliated because they could not take care of their own basic human needs:
"I asked to use the washroom. They would not allow me to use the
washroom. They brought me a urine cup. And they all stood there, so it was
uncomfortable. I could not use the washroom. So, after a while, they sent
just one man in there ... They unhandcuffed one hand for me to eat... It was like
I'm chained up, I'm helpless. I can't do anything ... You can't do anything. I
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think its worse than prison. At least in prison you can walk around. Back
there you can't. Just lay in your bed ... They brought a bedpan. I told them I
cannot use a bedpan because its uncomfortable. I have to make a bowel
movement. And she told me 'You either use this or you don't use it at all.'
... Ten minutes later I had to use the bathroom. They wouldn't come. So I
urinated. All in the bed."
[The worst part is] "Not being able to. To be stuck there. Not being able to
do anything. Not being able to scratch your nose if you had to, even. And
laying there and trying to. The harder that I tried to get out of them, the
tighter they got. And then, with people peeking in on me, like a. In the first
place, I just wanted to go someplace where it was quiet. I didn't want to be
strapped down ... It's frightening to be locked in somewhere, but, its not as
frightening as to be laying there, strapped to the bed, and can't move."
"They had to feed me from the spoon. Feed ~ ... They had to feed me like
I'm helpless. Which I was. In restraints, you are helpless. Arms tied down.
Ankles tied down ... Like I say, make you feel like you're a helpless person."
"And then, the fun part was that I had to urinate twice. And defecate twice.
Or 3 and 4 or 4 and 3. And so, here I am like a convalescent, like, I was
picturing Christopher Reeves ... They gave me a urinal, but it fell
out.. .. Nobody could hear me, so I couldn't hold it no longer. So, I just had to
urinate all over myself. Which was a fun feeling, 'cause it warmed me
up ... They came in. They rolled me up and dried me up.as best they
could ... Four or five times I had to urinate and defecate. And that was just an
unpleasant experience."
Several participants described feeling like they were tied up like an animal. Thomas
was probably the most explicit:
"I felt very uncomfortable. Like I was an animal being chained up. Only
difference was, wasn't chains around my neck ... I felt dirty. I felt cold. Back
there is cold. You can't do anything. You're chained down to a bed. I think
its worse than prison. At least in prison you can walk around ... Not being
funny, but, my mind went back to stories my grandma told me about slavery
days. I felt like I was a slave. I was chained up, I couldn't do anything. I was
under somebody else's command. Eat when they tell me to eat. Use the
bathroom when they wanted me to use it. "
Since the participants were unable to move, they realized that they could not
protect themselves should something happen to them. While in restraints, they were
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completely dependent upon the staff. They would not be able to defend themselves if
someone would try to hurt them. Some participants felt frightened by this
helplessness, especially if they did not know or did not trust the staff. As Thomas
said:
"It was like I'm chained up, I'm helpless. I can't do anything. What if they
wanted to just beat me. I'm not saying they would have. But, I'm just saying
that's the thoughts I had in my mind. What if one of the nurses would have
came in or just triggered, or their mind snapped. How can I protect myself?
Or if the hospital would have got on fire. Who said they was fast enough for
them to unchain me to get me out. Those were my thoughts and I was afraid.
More than 'fraid, I was terrified. Thoughts like that. Came to my head, the
place catch on fire and I'm locked up to the bed and can't move. And they try
to get all these patients out and here I am. They gotta find the key and unlock
this door. Unlock two doors. And then unlock all the chains you have on me.
What type of chance would I have to live?"
Barb said that the worst part of being restrained was:

"giving up the freedom totally ... I think its the sense of helplessness."
As she said this, there was a sadness in her tone of voice. She was barely audible.
After a long pause, she continued:
"If anything were to go wrong, that'd be it. If you were in restraints, the
delay of time it takes to get the restraints off... You know. Being in restraints
would be terrible if you didn't know for sure, that people around you weren't
going to hurt you. I can't imagine it."
It seemed that those participants who had been restrained before and those who
knew the staff felt the same sense of helplessness, but they were less afraid. Laurie
said that knowing the staff helped her not feel afraid:
"'Cause I knew. I had worked with those people. I had been here before. I
knew them. I knew that they were trying to help me."
Carl had also been in restraints before:
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"I knew I'd be safe. 'Cause I've been in restraints before. Maybe the first
time I was in restraints, I might have had a lot of fear. "
Marcia compared this event with other times she had been restrained. There was a
difference between this episode and the first one in the sense that she knew what to
expect--what to do and how to act. The first was more anxiety-producing because she
didn't know how long she would be restrained. She didn't know if she would be left
in there all night, like a friend of hers.
"[The first time I was restrained], I think that I was really kind of out of it, at
that point. But, I still was aware of some of what was going on. That's true,
I didn't really know as much. 'Cause you don't know if they're going to leave
you there for a long time, and like a friend of mine told me that they left her
there overnight, and she had to urinate and everything. It was really, just
totally, no reason for any of that. But. Time went by so much slower [the
first time] ... There was some uneasiness in there. I don't know why I wasn't
really scared, but. Yeah, more anxious, but [pause]. See, most of the time, it
was right after some physical, you know, entanglement, or whatever, and so,
for the first half hour, I was coming down from it. And then usually, they'd
check once or twice. And then, so, I was never like terrified."
Conclusion
This chapter has presented the experiences of ten individuals who were
restrained while they were hospitalized on psychiatric units. The themes that emerged
from the interview texts were organized into three distinct, yet interconnected
patterns. Thus, three stories emerged. These were: (1) Being-in-the-world (2) Being
mentally ill and (3) Being restrained. Being-in-the-world constituted the relation
between the participants and the researcher. Basically, this relation was one of
engagement and involvement, rather than distance. In this mode of involvement, the
researcher and the participants join in both telling and listening to the story. As the
story emerges, there is movement back and forth between the researcher and the
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participant. Whereas the story is how the researcher gains access to the participant's
world, it is the unknown that first draws the researcher in. It was the unknown that
first prompted me to ask about the meaning of being restrained. Then, as the
interview progresses, the answers to the questions prompt one to go deeper into the
unknown. It is this unknown that continues to draw the researcher in. Thus there is
movement between absence and presence and an unveiling of how things are for the
participants.
It was apparent that these participants struggled with how things are for them.

They struggled with the symptoms of their illnesses. Consequently, they were not
always sure what was happening to them nor whether they could trust and count on
others. They struggled with trying to figure this out. They struggled with trying to
understand how they were situated with the people they encountered. They struggled
also with how their lives were affected by their illnesses. They struggled with trying
to make choices or trying to decide if there was anything for them to live for.
Finally, on the inpatient psychiatric unit, they struggled with the staff about the rules.
Once restrained, they struggled to get free.
In essence, then, they struggled with their thrownness. they struggled with
how things are for them. This struggling prompted them to ask "Why me?" "Why,"
they asked, "was I thrown into restraints?" They wondered "Why are things the way
they are, and not some other way?"

Often, with the participants, the "Why me?"

question was not directly asked. Often, this "Why Me?" question was covered over
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by their angry feelings toward staff and their anger about being restrained. These
participants did not feel that they deserved to be restrained.
In their descriptions of being restrained, there is the movement of power

between the participant and the staff. The typical sequence of events began with a
struggle around the rules of the unit, usually with the participant resisting those rules.
This induced the staff members to exercise their power, ultimately by restraining the
patient. Therefore, the participants experienced being restrained as an exerting of
staff power, thereby disempowering the participants. As Marcia said, most of the
time she was aware of this power relation, but being restrained brought this relation
to the foreground. For these participants, then, the worst part of being restrained was
the powerlessness and subsequent helplessness that they felt. When they were
restrained, they felt dependent on staff to take care of their most basic needs and they
felt vulnerable to harm.
Restraint, then, became a metaphor for their lives. If one thinks of restraint as
being bound, being confined, or being constrained, then their illnesses and the
symptoms they experience are constraining. Their symptoms restrict and limit their
possibilities. While we all, by virtue of our thrownness, have limits to what is
possible, these participants are reminded that their illnesses impact how they are
living their lives. And so, for instance, Dan thinks of his friends and family over
Christmas, who are enjoying themselves while he is in restraints. According to
Foucault (1983), freedom is having an open field of possibilities. In a very concrete
way, psychiatric patients experience the constraining power that is exerted by others,
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literally by the use of leather restraints and more subtly by the rules and structure of
the unit. Less obvious, however, are the limiting and restraining effects of their
psychiatric illnesses. Mental health professionals rarely acknowledge that these
patients are struggling to be free of the constraining effects of their patients' illnesses.
This study has provided us with an understanding of what the experience of
being restrained was like for these ten participants. In this chapter, I have taken apart
this experience in order to deepen an understanding of how this event has come to ~
the experience that it is for those who have been restrained. Therefore, for example,
we have a sense not only that being restrained is disempowering, but how it has come
to be disempowering for the participants. We have sense also how, for Orlando, this
experience came to be empowering for him. The threat, however, in taking apart an
experience is that we lose a sense of the whole. What still is lacking, then, is a sense
of what being restrained, as-a-whole, was like for these participants. A sense of
being restrained, as-a-whole, is best captured by this quote from Prometheus Bound:
Strength:

Hephaestus:

Hephaestus:
Strength:
Hephaestus:

Here we have reached the remotest region of the earth, ...
Here is Prometheus, the rebel:
Nail him to the rock; secure him on this towering summit
Fast in the unyielding grip of adamantine chains ...
. . .With heart as sore as yours I now fasten you
In bands of bronze immovable to this desolate peak,
Where you will hear no voice, nor see a human form;
But scorched with the sun's flaming rays your skin will lose
Its bloom of freshness. Glad you will be to see the night
Cloaking the day with her dark spangled robe; and glad
Again when the sun's warmth scatters the frost at dawn.
Each changing hour will bring successive pain to rack
Your body; and no man yet born shall set you free ...
The iron wrists are ready.
Hammer with all your force, rivet him to the rock.
All right, I'm doing it! There, that iron will not come loose.
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Strength:
Hephaestus:
Strength:

Drive it in further; clamp him fast, leave nothing slack.
This arm is firm; at least he'll find no way out there.
Now nail his other arm securely. Let him learn
That all his wisdom is but folly before Zeus ...
Prometheus: 0 divinity of sky, and swift-winged winds, and leaping streams,
0 countless laughter of the sea's waves,
0 F.arth, mother of all life!
On you, and on the all-seeing circle of the sun, I call:
See what is done by gods to me, a god!
See with what outrage
Racked and tortured
I am to agonize
For a thousand years!
See this shameful prison
Invented for me
By the new master of the gods!
I groan in anguish
For pain present and pain to come:
Where shall I see rise
The star of my deliverance? ... (Aeschylus, 1961, p.22-24)

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION
Introduction
We, in psychiatric nursing, have inherited a tradition that no longer thinks about
the practice of restraining patients. As I reflect back to the beginning of this study, I
recall comments other colleagues made to me about this study. "Why," one physician
asked, "would you ever be interested in .that? If they need to be restrained, it doesn't
matter what they think." Other nurses said, "Do you think they can tell you anything?"
Or they asked, "How will you know that what they are telling you really happened?"
Other colleagues commented on the study itself--on the meaning of being restrained.
They said either "It doesn't mean anything to them" or "Don't you already know what it
means?" These comments reflect a tradition in psychiatry that takes this practice for
granted and no longer sees this practice as problematic.
One reason for not seeing the practice of restraining patients as problematic is
that we persist in not challenging the assumptions that underlie the use of restraints.
The findings from this study, at least from the perspective of the participants, do
challenge these assumptions. These findings challenge our assumptions by calling into
question the underlying belief that patients who are restrained are out of control. One
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of the surprises of this study was that none of the participants felt they were out of
control. Nor did they think they were a danger to self or others.
Whereas these participants did not feel they were out of control, some did seem
to have a sense that the situation they were involved in was escalating and could
potentially get out of hand. It is interesting to note the :words they used to describe
their situations:
"Okay, one time I came into the hospital and I guess that I was a little uppity or
something, I don't know, but they didn't really know who I was, or
. ... "
anythmg
"The second time was about two weeks ago. You'd think I'd be getting smart
by now. And, I wasn't getting any smarter. So, I got a little ornery here. Got
into their restraints, too."
"I was getting very bored. And there was hardly anything to do and I was
pacing the floors, and I guess I'm just. I want to go home. And I was tired of
being controlled by the system here in the institution. So, I got angry and I
started yelling."
Even when the participants acknowledged that they needed some external control, they
usually felt that using restraints was too extreme. They often felt that something else
could have been done in order to calm them down.
Since we assume that patients who are restrained are out of control and that
being out of control is frightening, we believe that patients will feel relieved, safe and
comforted by these external limits. None of the participants talked about feeling safe
and protected. In fact, they most often felt vulnerable. Those who felt most
vulnerable were also most frightened by the experience. These participants were
worried that since they were unable to defend themselves, anyone could come in and
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harm them. One would think that if the use of restraints is intended to provide for the
safety of the patient and the unit, it would be important that patients experience this
safety.
Whereas we assume that the use of restraints is therapeutic for the patient, these
participants most often perceived their being restrained not as therapeutic, but as a
consequence for not following the rules on the unit or doing what they were told.
Rather than experience the comfort of feeling safe and cared for, these participants
experienced these practices as coercive. As Doreen said:
"It's frightening to be locked in somewhere, but, its not as frightening as to be
laying there, strapped to the bed, and can't move. And the only thing that it did
was that it might scare me into being a little more, watching what I did and
said. But, as far as inside, I was still angry. And I was very angry at
everybody around it ... I still feel it sort of."
Furthermore, we assume that restraining patients is not a harmful practice. For
some of these participants, being restrained did seem to be harmful to them. Dan was
physically harmed by struggling while in restraints. For others, being restrained was
an experience that stayed with them. A few of the participants seemed to be greatly
affected by this experience. Even though they could not remember all of the details of
being restrained, they remembered the totality of being restrained. And, for the most

part, they remembered this experience as unpleasant. Listen to how Carl felt about
being restrained:
"All the times I've been in leather restraints, I think maybe four times in my
lifetime--two times being with this hospital stay, I feel that they're all traumatic
and I think all of them, like I said, would have been less traumatic if after the
experience. I mean, I'm not saying that they're not necessary. What I'm
saying is that after the fact, see, myself, speaking for myself, it was so
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traumatic, and my state of mind was to the point where I wasn't thinking
correctly, that I could not remember what happened--the events. So, the answer
to your question is, I'd say, they're all traumatic, with most recent being the
most.
Implications Related to Nursin& Practice

"The aim of a science of nursing is to contribute to better practical nursing"
(Fjetland & Gjengedal, 1994, p.4). While one must be cautious about generalizing
from this sample to an entire population, there are implications for nursing practice that
one may glean from what the participants have said. Often, these stories were difficult
for me to listen to. It was hard for me to believe that, at times, the nurses could treat
the patient so uncaringly. At times, the nurse in me wanted to defend the nurses. I
wanted to say, "Surely, they didn't~ say that." "Surely they didn't let him lay in
urine for that long a period of time.,,And yet, regardless of my feelings and the
temptation to sink back into the tradition out of which I came, these were the
participants' stories. Even if the details of the story did not happen exactly as the
participant told them, these stories .wm the experiences of those who were restrained.
And while we rarely acknowledge this, we can learn from these stories.
Ayojdin& Restrainin&

We need, first of all, to remember that this is a practice whereby we do
something to another person. This is a practice that renders another human being
helpless. And we need to think about a practice that does that to another person.
Clearly, being "tied down," immobile and helpless were the most disturbing aspects for
the participants. They felt dehumanized. Diane states it most graphically:
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..I thought I was going to die... Because I had lost all strength ... ! lost all strength
in my legs and my arms. I was helpless ... Like they strapped that tiger
down ... The only thing keeping me alive was my blood that's pumping my blood
in my heart ... ! felt like an animal, strapped down ... It's worse than
handcuffs ... Cause they're leather.... They're tight around the wrist and they
lock it with a key. JI
Therefore, we need

to~

use restraints as a last resort. We must intervene

with psychiatric patients in order to avert the need to restrain them. To this end, several
of the participants thought that an early verbal intervention could have prevented their
being restrained. As Marcia suggested:
..I would think that if they had come to me right off and just said, whatever they
were thinking. Like, if they were thinking, 'Marcia, you're tapping this table.
And, I'm thinking that maybe you're getting yourself real revved up here, so
what I want. I don't want you to end up in there.' If somebody had come up
and says all that to you, you'll think, 'No, I don't want to end up there. I'm
just a little nervous. And maybe I'll take a walk around the thing.' You know,
something like that ... And a lot of times, when you're a patient and you're kind
of drugged out or ECT'd out, you don't have the best perspective in the world.
Sometimes, you need the nurses around to be. And, they are, in most cases. JI
Dan had similar suggestions:
"All they had to do. All I, all someone else had to do was say, 'Dan, calm
down. Let's talk about it. Let's see what we can do about it.' I would have
responded. I'm an educated man. Though, I'm not. I'm not stupid. I know
when someone is pulling my leg. And I don't want to know. Just say 'Dan,
why don't we just talk about this. There's no need for you to swear. And holler
and get all crazy about it. That's no, that's no. You know as well as I do that
you're here. And you know why you're here. So, that's no way to behave.'
And I would have said, 'Alright, let's talk about it. 'JI
While it seems simple and obvious to say that the nurse could/should have talked to the
patient in order to deescalate an escalating situation, this is not always so simple. In
the first place, there are many reasons (the patient's past experience, the patient's
illness, the patient's relationship with the staff member) why the necessary trust
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between the patient and the staff member may not be there. For example, Dan realized
after making the above statement that he wasn't sure if he would have trusted the staff
member. In the past there had been times when he had calmed down, yet he was still
restrained:
11

And then what probably would have happened, what probably would have
happened. Is that they would have ... pulled the old trick of 'Okay, that's no
way to behave. Calm down.' Once I got calmed down, bingo, get the guys.
Get security in ... Wait a minute. No, it's not actually what they did. But that's
what they did on many occasions to calm me down. They would calm me down
and then threaten me or have security guards around me. Or have somebody, or
like nursing staff around me. You know, like 'calm down, its alright.' Yeah,
you're right, it's alright. Then, all of a sudden, look around, five guys stand
around ya. Of course it would agitate me more. Because it's a complete lie. If
you say to someone ''Calm down, let's talk this out' And then, you do talk it
out, but, you do it one on one, or with the people that are there. You don't
have five people come around. What's going to happen? If you're so worried
about it, why not put up bars?"
Thomas spoke of being let down and disappointed by the staff. From his perspective,
he had gone to his room when staff had asked him to (albeit kicking the garbage can
and slamming the door) and yet he was still restrained:
11

After they told me to go to my room, I did go to my room. and I asked that
question to them and they said, 'We never know what you're going to do.' And
I said, 'Well, I went to my room and laid down.' They said, 'Yes, you did.
But we didn't know what you were going to do if we come in there.' I said,
'You guys came in there with six or seven.'"
In the second place, intervening verbally is difficult because there are subtleties

to intervening with escalating patients. In order for the nurse to know what to say and
how to say it, the nurse must understand the particular needs of an individual patient.
The nurse must understand and be aware of an individual patient's subtle movement
between being in control and being out of control. In other words, the nurse must be
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aware of an individual patient's pattern of escalating. This knowledge and skill can
mean the difference between escalating a situation and defusing it.
Often, the psychiatric staff do not appreciate the subtlety involved in intervening
verbally. Therefore, they equate this intervention with setting limits. While setting
limits are important, the danger with focusing on setting limits is that the staff priority
becomes one of stopping the behavior rather than attending to the context surrounding
the behavior. Consequently, while these limits do not help the patient feel safe, they
do make the patient feel like a child. Thus, these limits begin a chain of events whose
inevitable endpoint is the participant being restrained. Here is how Diane described her
situation:
"I was cursing one person. I know, Jane. Her name's Jane ... 'Cause she kept
nagging me like I was a child. Instead of asking me or talking to me like I could
understand her or just would allow it. I told her she wasn't no nurse. So, you
know, I felt like she couldn't tell me nothing .... and then they came and
surrounded me."
Other participants thought that medication would have helped them calm down.
In fact, they would have preferred to be medicated rather than be restrained physically.

While Thomas objected to getting both the medication and being restrained, he asked
why the medication wasn't given to him earlier:
"But, they could have gave me a shot. They're already holding me down. They
could have just gave me a shot and made me relax. Other than chaining you up
like an animal. I'm against restraining, up to the point to it really necessary to
be used. I'm not saying that I was right, totally. Cause some of it was my
fault, but still ... All you had to do was give me a shot to calm me down and
make me go to sleep. You gave me a shot once you restrained me. What was
that for? To give me a shot while you were restraining me. For what'? You
already had me in restraints. Why should I have to go to sleep? If that was the
case, you could have gave me a shot in my room and just made me relax ... To
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me, restraints should be when it's out of hand. Really out of hand, when you
can't do any more. I dido' t hurt no one. Sure, I know they supposed to take
cautious. They never know what a person going to do. But, they could have
gave me a shot."
Doreen also suggested using medication. She was manic when she was admitted to the
hospital and told the physician she needed Lithium. And yet, for some reason it took
several days before her physician listened to her:
11

1 told them they should give me Lithium and I would start to feel better, which
I do, most of the time. But, it just doesn't seem to keep me from going up, but
once I'm up, it will bring me down. But, he gave me something. Then after
few days, after me telling him all the time, he decided to use the Lithium."
Not being listened to was a common theme among the participants. Doreen has
had many years of experience with her psychiatric illness and yet when she came into
the hospital, she knew what she needed, yet she was not listened to. James also has
had many years worth of experience with his illness. During the interview, he kept
asserting that he knew more than the physicians did about his illness. This was
probably true. What seems to have happened to psychiatric patients, especially those
who are hospitalized on psychiatric units, is that they have no voice. They have no
voice because we do not listen to them. We assume that they will not be able to tell a
coherent story. We assume that they do not understand their illness. We assume that
they do not know what they need. We, as professionals, assume that we know what is
best for the patient. Consequently, they are left feeling powerless. In trying to assert
his own sense of power, James said the following:
11

It's very complicated. I have a lot of power and influence over people rig_ht
now and it's a lot stronger than any staff member's here. Just because they're
in the position of being staff members, I've been dealing with my illness for
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thirty years. I have thirty years of experience ... And you know, I've been
dealing with this for thirty years. I know more than any, I know more than
probably most of these doctors know."
Knowin& The Patient
In order for the staff to intervene effectively with escalating patients, the staff

must know the patients. The challenge for the psychiatric nurse, however, is to
understand the world of the patients who, because of a psychiatric illness, may form
idiosyncratic interpretations of events in their lives. These idiosyncratic interpretations
will consequently be less likely to be shared and understood by others (like the staff).
While these idiosyncratic ways of interpreting events sometimes do make sense if one
explores them more fully, this task of trying to understand the world of the patient
becomes more difficult when the patient is escalating and things might get out of
control. It becomes more difficult when a patient is unknown to the staff. The key,
however, to being able to avert an escalating situation is knowing the patient. Dan said
it most directly:
"The way I'm proposing. Where the patients. When you say something to
patients, especially a patient and you should know their history. I believe every
nurse, every staff, every nurse, every doctor that interacts with a patient should
know, somehow, I know it takes time, should know the patient's history. I
mean, this unit I'm on is comprised of, I don't know, how many ... whatever
number of people ... What does it take for a staff of I don't know how many to
look over the general makeup. Or general positioning. Or history of [these]
patients."
Although experienced clinicians understand what it means to say that one knows
the patient, knowing the patient has only recently been articulated in the nursing
literature as an important concept that is central to skilled nursing judgment (Jenny &
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Logan, 1992; Radwin, 1996; Tanner, Benner, Chesla & Gordon, 1993). For expert
critical care nurses, "knowing the patient's patterns of responses" and "knowing the
patient as a person" emerged as two important components of knowing the patient
{Tanner, et al. 1993). It from this understanding of the patient that the nurse is then
able to individualiz.e care (Radwin, 1996).
Knowing the patient might have made a difference in the outcome of the
situations these participants described. Marcia, for instance, said that the nurse who
was working that day did not know her:
"It's just that I think she panicked a little bit, too. I didn't know this particular
one as well, that's true."
If the nurse had known Marcia better, she might have felt more comfortable
approaching Marcia and asking her what was going on. Thus, the focus would have
shifted from stopping the behavior to understanding the patient. The focus would have
also shifted from intervening for the sake of the milieu to intervening with the
individual patient. When the needs of the milieu are held to be primary, staff set limits
for the sake of keeping the milieu under control. Or, stated positively, the staff set
limits with the individual in order to keep the milieu from escalating and getting out of
hand. The problem with this focus, however, is that whereas the milieu is kept quiet,
the needs of the individual may be overlooked. It is only by knowing the patient that
the nurse can understand the patient and understand (know) what a particular patient
might need at a particular time. It is only by knowing the patient that the nurse can
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know that this person needs "space," another person needs firm limits and .still another
needs to talk.
The flip side to staff knowing the patient is the patient knowing the staff. It
seemed that when the participants knew the staff there was a qualitative difference in
how these participants felt about the experience. Dan had recently been admitted to the
hospital. Therefore, not only did staff not know

him, but he did not know the staff. It

seemed that participants who did not know the nurses were more frightened by or angry
at the restraint experience. When patients knew the staff, they trusted the staff
members and knew that they would not be harmed by the staff. They also believed that
despite disagreement with the decision to use restraints, the nurse was trying to help the
patient.

Carini: For the Patient
Despite the most expert nurse's efforts to calm an escalating patient, however,
there still will be times when restraining a patient is unavoidable. When this happens,
there must be ways to make this practice more humane. It seemed that those who were
restrained longer were more disturbed by the experience. In the first place, these
participants eventually needed to use the bedpan or urinal. They found this experience
humiliating and embarrassing. Those participants who were restrained longer also
experienced being restrained as dehumanizing. They were the participants who felt like
they were chained like animals. Thomas was in restraints overnight. Since he was
unable to get staff attention, he urinated in his bed. Here he describes what it was like
to lay in a wet bed:

113
11

1 had to use the bathroom again. They brought a bedpan. I told them I cannot
use a bedpan because it's uncomfortable. I have to make a bowel movement.
And she told me 'You either use this or you don't use it at all.' And she walked
out. Ten minutes later, I had to use the bathroom. They wouldn't come. So I
urinated. All in the bed. They let me lay in urine for an hour. I felted dirty. I
felted like I was in prison ... The next shift came and I told them I had to use the
bathroom and I had urine on myself. One nurse said she'll be back. She never
came back. About eleven o'clock, that's when someone came in, took my
clothes, gave me gowns. They washed my clothes. Put them in my room ... !
felt dirty. I felt cold. Back there is cold. You can't do anything. You're
chained down to a bed. I think it's worse than prison. At least in prison you
can walk around ... I was angry, bitter, [because] they let me lay in my
urine... One nurse that I really thought care for both [the] hospital and patient, I
found out it wasn't true. So I felt bitter ... ! was disappointed. Kinda angry, but I
got over it. But, it's something I'll never forget."
Other participants commented about the physical discomfort they felt while they
were restrained--the room was too cold or the restraints were too tight. Other
participants found the restraints, themselves, physically uncomfortable. Most of the
participants were unable to sleep while they were restrained. Still others were hurt
either while being placed in restraints or while struggling in restraints:

•n was real cold in there.

I had a jacket on, and they took it off to give me the
shot, and then, I was freezing in there ... The worst part of it was the covers
down at the foot of the bed. I couldn't get to them."

•1n the beginning, I resisted, and then they did some things that were very
uncomfortable to me. They kept pushing, pushing my face away from my
neck, and twisting my face, which was very uncomfortable."
•No, there was a nurse that allegedly was checking on me. And I was
screaming. My knee was in pain. And they finally said, 'I'll check' and she
came back. She came back, I think it was an hour and 45 minutes later. She
said she'd be back in 15 minutes. And my knee was in pain because I hurt it.
And she said, 'Ok, here's an ice pack.' So it was just like to torment me. Like
to say, 'Okay, asshole. We know you are in pain. You're bluffing us.' And, I
was in pain. 'Cause I put myself in pain. By trying to get out."
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There seem, therefore, to be some basic (and obvious) interventions that would
help the patient feel more cared for. (1) At the very least, the room should not be
cold. If the temperature cannot be regulated, then blankets should be provided to the
patient. (2) As the patient is calming down, the restraints could be loosened in order to
give the patient more freedom of movement. (3) Dan talked about being frightened
when the lights in the room were turned off. It would seem obvious to give the patient
some choice as to whether he or she wanted the lights on or off. (4) The law requires
staff to check on the restrained person every fifteen minutes. At these times, the
patient should be queried about the need to use the bedpan or urinal. The nursing staff
should provide assistance, yet some degree of privacy if the bedpan or urinal is
needed. (5) The law also requires staff to remove the restraints every two hours in
order to do range of motion. Some basic skin care might also be done at this time. (6)
Since there was not a clock in the restraint room, some of participants could not get a
sense of how long they were restrained or even what time it was. A clock would help
reorient them to the passage of time.
It requires, however, more than one merely performing these physical measures

in order for the patient to feel cared for. Another basic nursing intervention is the
nurse's physical presence. Some of the participants felt that they were alone and
abandoned while in restraints. Although staff would check on them, the staff member
often would not physically come into the restraint room. Instead, the participant was
checked through the window in the door. Other participants could not remember if the
staff checked on them at all. This contributed to the participant feeling abandoned.
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For these participants, it seemed important that they have both physical and verbal
contact with the staff. It seemed that the physical presence of the staff would have
given the participants some reassurance that they would be safe and taken care of. It
would also have been helpful had the staff given the participants some idea about what
was going to happen to them while they are in restraints. While the staff often assume
that patients know what to expect, those who have never been restrained do not know ..
This contributed to the participants' sense of fear and helplessness.
For these participants, then, it seemed that what was often not present was
perceived caring. As it is articulated by Swanson (1991; 1993), caring on the part of
the nurse consists of:

(1) Majntainin& beHef in the other person, including a hopeful

attitude and realistic optimism toward the patient. This includes those actions by the
nurse that help patients attain meaning from their experiences. (2) Knowin& the
patient, including recognizing the individuality of each patient as the patient is
responding to different life experiences. (3) Doin& for the other which consists of those
physical measures that the nurse performs when the patient is unable. These include
comforting the patient, protecting the patient and preserving dignity.

(4) Bein& with

the patient, which consists of those actions by the nurse that convey to patients that they
matter to the nurse. By being with the patient, the nurse conveys a sense of emotional
availability to the patient. And (5) enabHn& the patient. This includes those actions
whereby the nurse is supporting, encouraging, and assisting the patient to eventually

be able to take care of oneself.
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It seemed clear that these participants were asking for these caring actions.

What is not clear from the interviews, however, is whether these caring practices were
not done for the participant or were not remembered. It is possible that the participant
did not remember what was done. For all of the participants, there were parts of the
experience of being restrained that they could not remember. Some would say directly
that they couldn't remember, whereas others did not know why or if something was
done to/for them. For example, some of the participants did not seem to understand
why they were restrained. Was this an issue of not remembering what happened? For
Carl, this was his main concern. He could not remember what he had done to warrant
being restrained. Consequently he was unable to put the pieces together. Other
participants said that staff didn't check on them. Was this also an issue of not
remembering? Other participants could not remember details of the event and cited
the medication as the reason they couldn't remember. In these situations, their concern
was knowing that they could not remember events that were happening in their lives.

An obvious solution is to talk to the patient. Staff need, first of all, to

acknowledge that being restrained is a significant event and, as with any significant
event, they should give the patient an opportunity to talk about it. This means that the
staff need to talk about what led up to the restraining event. The staff and the patient
should share their understanding about how and why things happened the way they did.
There should also be some opportunity for patients to discuss how they were f~ling
about being restrained, as well as what might have helped them stay out of restraints.
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Since the event itself seemed to stay with the participants, processing the event may
help the patient resolve it. Carl was the one participant who seemed most determined
to feel settled about the staff and the situation before he was discharged:
"I realize that there's human error, there. You know, there's two different
people and they're going to think. They're going to have a different viewpoint
of the situation. So that's why I came to the point of like, that's okay. But. .. I
was mentally out of it the first time and communication, lead by the staff, was
certainly. If nothing else happens with all the people you've been talking to,
there's some kind of communication. And it's going to have to be something
that's going to have to be worked out, as far as how long after, is it norm. And
how to approach. What kind of questions. Will certainly have to. That's your
job to detail out."

Limitations of the Study
The major limitation of this study is related to the sample. This study consisted
of a small sample of individuals who were fairly similar in that they were restrained on
similar kinds of units and had similar diagnoses. For example, none of the participants
had a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Although some patients with this diagnosis had been
restrained, they tended to be too disorgani7.ed to be able to be interviewed. It would,
however be interesting in the future to try and interview these individuals. It would
also be interesting in the future to investigate this phenomenon with patients on
different kinds of units (such as a Veterans Administration hospital or a state hospital).
It seemed that the perceptions of the participants were dependent upon the particular
culture of the unit, thus, a different kind of unit might change the kinds of responses
the participants would give.
The other limitation is that this study only presents the voice of the participants.
That was the purpose of the study, but, one must remember that since the use of
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restraints occurs in interaction with others (the nurses), there are other voices and
stories that could be told. It would be interesting to hear those voices in the future.
Implications Related to the Met:hodolo&y

Heideggerian phenomenology was introduced to nursing via Benner' s work
(1984). This work is based upon the Dreyfus Model of Skill Acquisition and Dreyfus'
(1991) interpretation of Heidegger's three modes in involvement in the world--readyto-hand, unready-to-hand and present-at-hand (Benner & Wrubel, 1989). As Benner &
Wrubel articulate it, in the ready-to-hand mode all activity is running smoothly. The
person who is engaged and involved in an activity does not deliberate or think about
what he or she is doing. Similarly, in this smooth-running activity, the equipment one
uses becomes an extension of the body. Thus the piece of equipment, itself, goes
unnoticed. Benner extrapolates the ready-to-hand to include the body. Thus, when the
body is working smoothly, it also remains unnoticed and taken for granted. It is only
during times of breakdown that the equipment (or the body) is noticed. Therefore, in
the unready-to-hand mode, smooth functioning is interrupted and one no longer takes
the activity for granted. In the third mode of involvement, the present-at-hand, the
situation one is involved in is viewed from an objective, detached stance. Therefore, in
the present-at-hand mode, both the context and the activity are absent. The piece of
equipment one used is now described in terms of objective properties that omit the
lived situation one had been involved in.
Benner' s research with nurses has been based on the assumption that expert
nursing practice is an engaged activity. Since expert nurses are skilled practitioners,
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they no longer deliberately think about what they are doing. Their practice is one of
skilled involvement and smooth functioning. Thus, the practices of expert nurses
remain unnoticed and are taken for granted. The goal of her research, then, has been
to identify and describe nursing knowledge that is embedded within nursing practice.

In other words, she has tried "to capture [the] everyday skills, habits, and practices" of
nurses (Benner, 1996, p. 351). Her contribution to nursing has been to articulate and
make explicit some of these taken-for-granted practices.
Diekelmann (1991; 1992; 1993) and Rather (1992) have expanded Benner's
work and have utifued interpretive phenomenology as their research methodology in
order to articulate the common meanings and shared practices of students and teachers
of nursing. Chesla (1995) and Plager (1994) have proposed using this same
methodology to study the practical activity of family life on order to articulate family
meanings and concerns. And Walters (1995a; 1995b) has used this methodology to
study the caring practices of critical care nurses and the lived experiences of the
relatives of critically ill patients.

In general the research studies that utilize Heideggerian phenomenology share
the following assumptions: (1) Humans are "situated within meaningful activities,
relationships, commitments, and involvements that set up both possibility and
constraints for living" (Chesla, 1995, p. 66). (2) Humans both constitute and are
constituted by the world in which they live. In other words, "the world of meanings
and practices into which we arrive sets up who we are as well as how we understand
ourselves and our possibilities" (Chesla, 1995, p. 69). (3) "The way humans live in the
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world is in engaged practical activity" (Chesla, 1995, p. 71). (4) "The way that
humans are engaged in their world is set up and bounded by what matters to them"
(Chesla, 1995. p. 74). (5) Humans understand something as something because of a
background of shared human practices (Plager, 1994).
Since these researchers are interested in what people do in the ready-to-hand
mode, practical activity has been used as the starting point for their research. Thus, the
researchers access practical activity by observing others who are involved in an
activity, talking to others about what they do in this activity or eliciting narrative
stories from others about the situations they are involved in (Chesla, 1995). Since the
researchers assume that shared practices and meanings are embedded within these
everyday activities, the aim of the research has been to articulate these hidden practices
and meanings. Meaning, then, is said to reside in everyday activity (Rather, 1992),
since "meaning is shared and handed down culturally through language, skills and
practices and is directly perceived by the individual" (Allen, Benner, Diekelmann,
1986, p. 29).
Since this interpretation of Heidegger has been the framework for interpretive
research in nursing, studying the phenomenology of being restrained presented me with
some methodological questions. First of all, being restrained is a practice that one
person (the nurse) does .to another person (the patient). While restraining another or
setting limits or calming an escalating patient may all be viewed as the everyday
practices of psychiatric nurses, restraining is not a practice that the patient is engaged
in--at least not in the sense that Heidegger talks about the ready-to-hand mode of
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involvement.

Bein& restrained is not the same kind of intentional activity because the

patient is not do.in& the restraining. And yet, the patient is definitely an involved
person. Thus, while one Wl1ld study the practices of restraining, this study was to be a
study of bcini restrained. It was to be studied as an experience that the participant was
involved in and went through, but not in the same sense as an activity that one is do.in&.
Being restrained was seen as an event or experience in the participant's life. Therefore,
I was less interested in the practices of restraining (how the patients were restrained)
and more interested in the participants' understanding of being restrained.
Secondly, being restrained is not an "everyday" practice. While it greatly
impacts the patient's everyday activities, being restrained is an unusual event. It
usually results, not when things (interactions between people) are going along
smoothly, but when things go awry. Therefore, since I was not studying everyday
practical knowledge or events and since I was not studying the practices of restraining,
I wondered how/if Heidegger would fit theoretically with the aim of the study.
To understand how the philosophy of Martin Heidegger fit within the aims of
this study, I would first like to make a distinction between the methodology and the
method. The methodology is the theory (or theories) that underpin what one does as a
researcher and the methods are the particular techniques the researcher uses to collect
and 3;11alyze the data (Harding, 1989). Therefore, while all qualitative research
methods direct the researcher to listen to what a participant is saying, how the
researcher chooses the participants, how the questions are asked of the participants and
what the researcher listens for in the interview will vary depending on the
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methodology. Similarly, while all qualitative methods direct the researcher to analyre
the interview texts for themes, what the researcher "sees" in the text and what/how the
researcher names the themes will reflect the methodological framework one uses.
Methodologically Benner's research (and others) is based on the assumptions
articulated earlier, which were based on a particular way of interpreting Heidegger.
While this interpretation is not wron&, it is not fundamental to what Heidegger is trying
to say. Therefore, I would argue that a more fundamental interpretation of Heidegger
(such as that suggested earlier) expands the usefulness of the philosophy of Heidegger
as a framework for interpretive phenomenology as a research methodology. The key to
understanding this possibility lies in the first assumption that Chesla articulates:
Humans are "situated within meaningful activities, relationships, commitments, and
involvements that

set up both possibility and constraints for livin& [emphasis mine]"

(Chesla, 1995, p. 66). This assumption has emerged from Heidegger's explication of
involved, practical activity (our practical taking-as) as exemplified in Heidegger's
discussion of the work-shop and hammering. Thus, we have a practical activity
(hammering) that is situated within someone's (the carpenter's) world (the referential
context). And, hammering has meaning within that referential context. Heidegger has
used the example of practical activity in order to further explicate the structure of the
entity for whom the hammer has meaning (human beings). Heidegger (1953/1959;
1975/1988; 1984/1994), in his investigation, questions how it is that an entity (or
anything at all) is meaningful to one. He is interested in explicating the grounding for
that meaning. In other words, abstracting from his starting point (hammering),
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Heidegger (1927/1962) ultimately shows how temporality (finitude) grounds the
meaningful presence of an entity to human beings. Heidegger thus concludes that
entities have meaning to humans because we are finite mortal becoming. It is not the
activities, relationships and involvements, per se, that set up possibility and constraints,
but it is our always already aheadness that then is the condition for the possibility that
we can be involved in these relationships and activities. This is a subtle, yet significant
difference.
Therefore, if finitude grounds our forming a world from which entities have
meaning and an entity is a thing or an experience or an affect, it seemed logical that
one's finite mortal becoming would be the grounding for an experience (such as being
restrained) to be meaningful to one. It seemed apparent that, just as humans understand
the being of tools, individuals also understand the being of other entities, such as
experiences. Heidegger, in articulating the meaning of being, provides a framework
for research studies that aim to articulate how an entity (such as an experience) is
meaningfully present to one. Heidegger provides a framework for the researcher who
is interested in context and how an event fits within that context. Heidegger provides a
framework for meaning that is an alternative to methods that presume a subject/object
distinction.
Heidegger, in privileging an engaged mode of involvement also provides the
methodological framework for a particular stance or way the researcher is in relation to
the participants and the data. This stance is one of openness, thus allowing something
to emerge from both the participants and the data. Finally, Heidegger reminds the
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researcher that finitude is intrinsic to this disclosive process. Thus, the researcher, in
addition to being open, must actively "bring" something out of concealment, while at
the same time remembering that there will always be concealment.
Limitations Related to Heicie&&er

While the philosophy of Heidegger has provided the methodological grounding
for this study and, to some extent, has helped deepen our understanding of the
participants' experiences of being restrained (in terms of understanding how this
experience was made present to the participants), there are limitations related to
Heidegger's philosophy. The major limitation, related to interpretive research, is
Heidegger's productionistic metaphysics (Zimmerman, 1990). Heidegger's main
concern is about working and producing. Thus he privileges our practical taking-as.
For Heidegger, meaning is manifested in these activities. Thus, we use a tool in order
to do something (to make something or produce something) for the sake of our own
being--our own future. Therefore, Heidegger's focu.s is on things and how they are
produced, analyzed and used--not on social institutions and practices (Zimmerman,
1990).
Whereas the nurse researchers have taken Heidegger's examples of using tools
and practical taking-as and have applied these concepts (ready-to-hand, present-at-hand,
unready-to-hand) to the body, as Zimmerman points out, Heidegger contends that "it is
a categorical mistake to conceive of animal organs as 'tools'. Tools have the character
of 'readiness' (Fertigkeit); they are separable from the user, and can be used by anyone
at any time. Organs, such as the eye, however, are not separable from the organism;
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organs are not external 'parts' with which the organism is somehow 'equipped'"
(Zimmerman, 1990, p. 194). Therefore, the in-order-to that we observe in a tool is
different than the in-order-to of an organ in the body.
As humans, we are all involved in practices and activities that do not involve
tools and equipment and producing and using. Heidegger does little to explicate these
practices. If meaning is disclosed in our practical taking-as (in using the entity for
some purpose), how, for instance does a practice such as nursing fit within this
context? Nursing as a practice involves more than using tools and equipment. In fact,
one could argue that the most important aspects of the practice of nursing do not
involve tools, but involve the people we deal with. In Heidegger's philosophy, the
practices of being-with another are less well developed. Dreyfus (1992), in contrasting
Heidegger with Foucault, says "whereas Foucault is concerned solely with what is
happening to people, Heidegger is concerned almost exclusively with what is happening
to thinp" (p. 91).
Although Heidegger recognizes that we are in-the-world with others, he does
not fully develop a notion of engagement with others or interaction with others. This
became apparent as being restrained emerged as a practice that involves social
institutions and practices. Since Heidegger privileges an individualistic, solitary concept
of being human, his philosophy had limited usefulness when trying to understand a
practice (such as restraining) that involves interactions between people. The only
relevant interactional concept was his notion of "leaps in" and "leaps ahead."
Heidegger's notion of being-with means that we are Eth others in the world, yet he
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does not say ~ we are with others in the world. Nor does he mention how one .ou&ht
to be with others in the world. When Heidegger does talk about being-with others, it
becomes most fully developed when he discusses our everyday being-in-the-world as
falling beings. For Heidegger, fallenness is a deficient way of being-in-the-world
whereby we are lost in the masses, talcing our possibilities from what "they" say we
should be doing. Thus, we forget our individuality. We do not take hold of who we
are. Thus we live inauthentically.
Therefore, although Heidegger MlS helpful in grounding a notion of how one's
being is manifested in the world, he had little to say to enhance my understanding of an
interactional event like being restrained. In other words, Heidegger provided the
structure for the study, but contributed little to the content, i.e. to enhance
understanding. For the content, Foucault had more to say.
One reason for this difference may be that Heidegger and Foucault had two
different projects. Heidegger's project was to articulate a fundamental ontology of
being human. Thus, he had little interest in the actualities of living in this world,
except to use these everyday examples as places from which to begin so he could then
abstract to an ontological level. That is why, I think, that "in Heidegger's 'everyday'
world, there are no beggars, lepers, hospitals, homeless people, sickness, children,
meals, animals .... There are however, plenty of tables, chairs, houses, tools and
instruments of all sorts" (Caputo, 1993, p. 65). While these things were not of concern
to Heidegger, his lack of concern for them is a limitation in his philosophy. Foucault's
project, on the other hand was "to create a history of the different modes by which, in
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our culture, human beings are made subjects" (Foucault, 1983, p. 208). Whereas
Heidegger's project was to articulate the structure of human beings, Foucault's project
was to articulate the structure of power relations between individuals and social
institutions. This is why, in this particular study, Heidegger's philosophy could ground
the methodology, but Foucault was able to deepen an understanding of being
restrained.
Implications Related to Future Study
In many ways, this study raised more questions than it answered. To begin

with, I had assumed that the participants would talk about feeling out of control. I had
also expected some of the participants to feel a sense of safety by being restrained.
Neither assumption was borne out in this study. The participants did, however, talk
about feeling controlled in a restrictive environment. They did talk about not feeling
safe. There needs, therefore, to be more research in order to understand this balance
between control and safety. How much control is really needed for safety? What are
the practices that make a patient feel safe and cared for? And at what point does the
structure of the unit and the rules of the unit precipitate resistance and struggling?
With these participants, I could not help wonder how much of the power
struggling and resistance could have been prevented. How, then, do expert nurses set
limits without engaging in a power struggle? How do expert nurses deescalate an
escalating patient? How do expert nurses decide when to leap in and when to give the
patient space? Diane, for instance, wanted to be left alone. But, was she safe to be
left alone? Would space have calmed her down?
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Iust leave me alone. I just wanted them to leave me alone. Yeah, you know.
You're not telling me to go to my room. I come here and want to smoke a
cigarette or anything like that and tell me go back to my room. You know, I'm
not here to hurt nobody or no. I'm not here to harm nobody. And I don't want
nobody to harm me, but. Give me the benefit of the doubt. I asked you all to
leave me alone. You told me to go into my room until 8:30. Its 8:30 already.
And they think I'm going to harm the other people in there. Cause they were in
there eating. I said. I respect elderly people. I'm not going to hurt them. But, it
was just a mix up, man."
11

How do expert nurses decide when to restrain? How do they decide when verbal
11

interventions are no longer effective? Finally, what does knowing the patient" mean to
psychiatric nurses?
Since one of the limitations of this study was the small and fairly similar
sample, this study needs to be expanded to include patients with other diagnoses and
patients who are on other kinds of units. It would also be interesting to interview
patients who did perceive themselves to be out of control. Would these patients
experience being restrained differently? It would be helpful for nurses to know what it
is like for these patients to feel out of control.
Finally, in this study, the voice of the nurse was not heard. What is the
experience of restraining like for the nurses? What is it like to work with escalating
and potentially dangerous patients? And how do expert nurses assess dangerousness?
It seems clear from this study that the practice of restraining patients continues to be
unnoticed and taken for granted. It is also clear that restraining patients is only one
aspect of the practices of psychiatric nurses. Benner is correct when she says that there
is knowledge embedded within the practice of expert nurses. Therefore, practices of
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psychiatric nurses need to be articulated. Otherwise, we will continue to rely on
restraining these patients.
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APPENDIX A
SUBJECT INFORMATION SHEET
YOU ARE INVITED TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH PROJECT DESIGNED
TO EXPLORE WHAT IT IS LIKE TO HAVE BEEN IN LEATHER RESTRAINTS
ON A PSYCHIATRIC UNIT.
PARTICIPATION IS COMPLETELY VOLUNTARY. Refusal to participate will
involve no penalty or loss of benefits. You may discontinue participation at any time
without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are entitled.
There are no additional costs to you, the participant.
Wbat does the study consist ofl
The study consists of audiotaped interviews, lasting about 60-90 minutes. There will
be 10 participants included in this study. Interviews will be conducted by the principal
investigator.
During the interview, you will be asked to share your story of your experience being
restrained. It is possible that you might be contacted by telephone following the
interview for clarification or review of the interview text. If so, you will receive no
more than two calls. If you would prefer not to be recontacted, please indicate by
placing your initials here: _ _ _ __

Are there an)' risks?
It is possible that through discussion and recollection of your experiences, painful
memories could occur. You may stop the discussion at any time.

Are there any benefits?
It is possible that you could feel better having had an opportunity to talk about your
experience. It is also hoped that information obtained from this study will help nurses
better understand the patient's needs and experiences.

Wben and where will the interview be done?
The interview will be scheduled at a time and place that are convenient for you.
Wbo wm have access to the interview material?
The audiotaped interviews will be transcribed by the principal investigator or trained
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transcriptionist, and then destroyed. Any identifying information from the interview
will be removed or altered on the written transcript. The transcripts may be shared
with the study committee consisting of the principal investigator and three faculty
members. It may also be shared with two other researchers who are familiar with
interpretive research. No individual identities will be detectable in any reports or
publications resulting from the study.

Wbat if you cban&e your mind?
You are free to withdraw from this study or to refuse permission for the use of your
audiotaped interview or transcript at any time.
YOU MAY TAKE AS MUCH TIME AS YOU WISH TO THINK THIS OVER.
BEFORE YOU SIGN THIS FORM, PLEASE ASK ANY QUESTIONS ON ASPECTS
OF THE STUDY THAT ARE UNCLEAR. I, THE PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR,
WILL ATTEMPT TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE PRIOR TO,
DURING, OR FOLLOWING THE STUDY.
AUTHORIZATIONS:
I,
have read and
understand the information in this Subject Information Sheet and have received a copy.
I have volunteered to participate based on this information. My signature indicates that
I give permission for information I provide in the interview or the transcript to be used
for publication in research articles, books, and/or teaching materials, as well as for
presentation at research symposia. Additionally, my signature indicates that I have
received a copy of this consent form.
Signature_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Date_ _ _ _ _ __
Telephone_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
If you need further information, please contact the principal investigator:
Mary Johnson, RN, MS,
Practitioner-Teacher, Rush Presbyterian St. Luke's Medical Center
924 Schweppe-Sprague Hall
1743 W. Harrison St.
Chicago, Illinois ti0612
312-942-2766
Doctoral Student
Loyola University School of Nursing
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